Request Information from Booth

Loading...

  • Select
  • Submit
  • Success

Climate change presents the economy with an uncertain future. Policymakers typically want to justify decisions based on a pretense of knowledge, says Lars Peter Hansen, a Nobel laureate and the David Rockefeller Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Departments of Economics and Statistics and at Chicago Booth. This can make researchers hesitant to communicate the full uncertainties that emerge from climate-economic research, such as the long-term human impact on climate change, or the ultimate damages to the economy and society. Since these uncertainties are substantial and challenging to quantify, there is a fear that some policymakers will use this as an excuse to delay action.

“In the case of climate change, that delay can make it much costlier to address the consequences of climate change in the future,” Hansen said during the Climate Challenge, the second event in Booth’s Future of Capitalism series. The event was co-sponsored by Booth’s Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation.

How can decision theory help better incorporate uncertainty into climate-economics models designed to support policy analysis? More generally, what are productive ways to confront climate change from the vantage point of both policymakers and private sector enterprises?

Hansen explored these questions with Mili Fomicov, ’11, research associate at Imperial College’s Centre for Climate Finance and Investment, and Sir Ronald Cohen, chairman of Impact Investment’s Global Steering Group and The Portland Trust. He’s also the author of IMPACT: Reshaping Capitalism to Drive Real Change (2021). Moderated by Randall S. Kroszner, deputy dean for Executive Programs and the Norman R. Bobins Professor of Economics, their conversation illuminated the trade-offs of climate action, the role of technology, and the importance of financial risk models.

four speakers appearing on FOC panel

- Hi, everyone,

thank you so much for
joining us this morning,

this afternoon, this evening,

depending on where you're tuning in from.

Welcome to the second session

of the Future of Capitalism
series, The Climate Challenge,

hosted by the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business

and the Rustandy Center for
Social Sector Innovation

at Chicago Booth.

I'm Caroline Grossman,

executive director of
Booth’s Rustandy Center

and adjunct faculty here at Chicago Booth.

If you're not familiar
with the Rustandy Center,

we're Booth’s social impact hub.

I'm so excited to be here today

to continue the Future
of Capitalism series.

I've been chatting with the panelists

in the green room the last few minutes,

and you're certainly in for a treat.

This series brings
together economic experts

from Booth, the University
of Chicago and beyond

to discuss the ways in
which our economic systems

are evolving as expectations
about the role of business

and society change.

This series explores the
evolution of capitalism

from the perspective of
investors, academics,

entrepreneurs, healthcare professionals,

and other thought leaders.

At the Rustandy Center,

we think a lot about the
business of business.

Some of our recent research
initiatives are homing

in on this topic.

We've partnered with the
HBS Impact Collaboratory

and the Wharton Social Impact Initiative

at University of Pennsylvania
to build a database

on impact investing funds.

The goal being to learn more about the way

impact investing funds
are managed and governed

and how their performance
can spur research

and evidence-based practices.

And this summer we published a report

exploring the most commonly disclosed

corporate social responsibility
metrics from S&P 500 firms.

The database provides a much
needed window into CSR metrics

and industry performance

for those who rely on ESG scores,

from investors to researchers.

Today's question will seek
to understand the question

of what business owes society by focusing

on one of the most urgent topics

of our time, climate change.

We've convened an
impressive panel of speakers

to examine the business
and economic implications

of this immense challenge.

Our moderator is Randy Kroszner,

deputy dean for executive programs

and Norman R. Bobins Professor
of Economics at Booth.

Randy served as governor of
the Federal Reserve System

from 2006 until 2009,

chaired the committee on supervision

and regulation of banking institutions

and the committee on consumer
and community affairs,

and took a leading role
in developing responses

to the financial crisis and understanding

and undertaking initiatives

to improve consumer
protection and disclosure.

Randy will facilitate today's conversation

with a terrific group.

Lars Peter Hansen is Nobel laureate

and is an internationally known
leader in economic dynamics

and indeed recipient
of the 2013 Nobel prize

in economic sciences.

He currently serves as
the David Rockefeller

Distinguished Service Professor
in Economics and Statistics

at Booth and at the College
here at University of Chicago,

is the research director

of the Becker Friedman
Institute for Economics,

and won 2021 Michael J.
Brennan Best Paper Award

for joint research on

"Pricing Uncertainty
Induced by Climate Change."

Look forward to diving into
professor Hansen's research

in just a few moments.

Sir Ronald Cohen is widely considered

the father of impact investment

and European venture capital,

and co-founded the Global
private equity firm,

Apax Partners Worldwide,

and the impact finance
and advisory nonprofit

Social Finance in the United Kingdom,

United States, and Israel.

Sir Ronald currently serves as chairman

of the Global Steering
Group for Impact Investment,

the Impact-Weighted Accounts Initiative

at Harvard Business School,

and the Portland Trust.

And his book "Impact: Reshaping Capitalism

to Drive Real Change"

is not only on my bookshelf,

but also a Wall Street Journal bestseller.

And finally Mili Fomicov is
a Booth alumna like myself

and a researcher at the
Centre for Climate Finance

and Investment at the
Imperial College London.

Is the academic director

for the Corporate Renewable
Procurement Program

at the Grantham Institute
at Imperial College,

and was previously director
and portfolio manager

of multi-asset strategies at BlackRock.

Also has been at JP Morgan,
Barclays, AllianceBernstein,

and is a member of the
Spark Change advisory board

and a climate strategist as well.

So welcome to all of you.

And at this point,

Randy, I'll hand it over
to you so we can dive in.

- All right, thank you so much, Caroline.

This is very exciting for me

because this is our second installment

of the Future of Capitalism.

I think a really interesting
and exciting series

to get at the most fundamental
issues facing us today,

and obviously the climate
challenge is one of those.

And I think one of the key things that

our approach at Booth is very helpful with

is really how to think about problems.

And so trying to come up with

a very clear systematic framework

for thinking through the most
important issues of the day,

corporate, social
responsibility, ESG, climate,

and then using that framework
to try to clarify issues

and also to try to
specify what are the key

and right questions
that we need to address.

And then that allows us

to have a way of thinking
about what are the data

that we need in order to be
able to answer those questions,

whether it's private sector investment,

whether it's government
investment, whether it's policy.

And I think today's panelists,

they're just perfect for trying to get

at that set of issues,

really thinking about the right
way to think about things,

specifying questions, and
then how to get the best data

to try to actually answer those questions.

And so what I'm gonna
do is first start off

with a little discussion with Lars

on some of the incredible work

that he has done

on thinking about one of
these most pressing issues.

But of course, there's an
enormous amount of uncertainty

when it comes to climate models.

That's true of all types of modeling.

Whenever we're thinking about the future,

there's always a lot
of uncertainty involved

and we always have to be a bit humble

because we can never know
the future with certainty.

We can try to estimate
it as well as we can,

but in doing policy and
making practical decisions

on investment, we need to
be aware of what we know

and what we don't know.

And so Lars if I could turn to you first

and get your perspective on

what are some of the
key issues that you see

in climate economics

that pose these uncertainty challenges?

What are the key issues of
uncertainty in climate economics?

If you could unmute yourself, please.

- Thank you, Randy,

and thank you for this
opportunity to share ideas.

And I look forward to learning
from other panelists as well.

So of course, I
am all in that climate change

is a very important problem,

one that's very challenging
as we go forward.

For the type of research that I do,

it has to do with trying to figure out

how to confront uncertainty
in kind of sensible ways.

And so our starting point is the fact

that from policy standpoints,

policymakers tend to
want to project inclusions

with great confidence,
and scientific evidence

does not always bear that.

And how do we be true to
the scientific evidence

and still come up with sensible policies?

And I believe there's ways to do that.

I think economics has had
a lot to say about that.

There's literature on
so-called decision theory

that confront those types of questions.

And so a concern,

I think, of policymakers is
kind of once you announce,

‘well, we don't really
fully understand things,’

then the next conclusion
we jumped to is ‘therefore

we don't do anything.’

But like in the case of climate change,

that could be delaying can
make it very, very costly

to make changes in the future
and then maybe lower costs

to adjust now,

even in the presence of—
to make adjustments now

in the presence of uncertainty,

rather than to delay
until we’re fully confident

that we understand the full
impacts of climate change.

So that's the type of trade-offs,

which I'm trying to wrestle with

in terms of thinking
about policy challenges.

Now, the uncertainties.

So let me start, that show
up in our work is one:

We're interested in emissions
and how they translate

into environmental changes
like temperature changes.

So there's lots of
climate science evidence

that documents a human
imprint on the environment.

But once you try to quantify that,

they're surely gonna certainly show up.

Emissions as you try to trace
to its impact on temperature

over 10, 20, and up to 100 years,

there's a substantial uncertainty as to

what that impact's gonna be.

Now you factor on things like
so-called tipping points.

So there's conjectures,

that you cross certain
thresholds of a temperature

or other environmental indicators,

more dramatic things
will happen. It’ll spill over

to even more dramatic consequences
for the climate system.

Those are possibilities,

those type of non-linearities

or threshold effects are possibilities,

but to quantify a meeting
point is challenging,

and so how do we do that?

The other piece is so-called
damages, economic damages.

Once we do damage the environment,

then we come back and start
asking you as economists,

what are the economic
consequences of that?

Because people will adapt,
there will be modifications.

How do we really measure
those potential damages?

And there frankly might be the
biggest source of uncertainty

in the sense of there's lots
of speculation about that,

but there's not any kind of
really hard quantification.

And the challenge for that
is we'd love evidence,

but we're really talking
about moving rural economies

in the places they haven't
really experienced historically.

So it's not as if we turn to evidence

and it just magically
addresses this question.

We have to think about it kind
of conceptually, economically,

and make smart guesses about
the nature of the uncertainties here.

And these components of uncertainties

actually interact in very important ways.

They're not kind of easily separable

or additive or like that we have to...

It’s very important

to think about them simultaneously
rather than distinctly.

- And so how do you think
about some of these trade-offs

that you're talking about?

'Cause obviously there's
a strong desire to act,

but we have a lot of uncertainty.

And so how do you use the framework

of decision-making and uncertainty

to think about these kinds of trade-offs?

- Yeah, so in some of our
calculations which we've done,

which are a bit illustrative to this point

and we are working on
making it more ambitious,

imagine you've got the following:

You’ve got a world in which we're
not sure about the damages,

but once we start damaging
the economy in the future,

then it might become kind
of all the more evident.

So as a trade-off here,
we could say, well,

we can wait until we learn
about that damage curvature.

And it may be very,
very steep consequences.

There may be well, there may be good news,

maybe they're not as
dramatic as we feared.

And so how do we...

So our type of analysis,

we want to go through and confront those,

those types of trade-offs.

And so we do with the calculations,

like so-called social cost of carbon.

So what's the social cost of carbon?

For people with an asset
pricing perspective,

a social cost of carbon
is just like an asset,

asset what you value
with the dividend stream.

There's emissions that
go into the atmosphere.

It has social consequences
tomorrow, the next day,

and kind of way off in the future.

How do we then produce that
into kind of meaningful measures

of things like the social cost of carbon,

and then to figure out what
are sensible emissions policies

that might progress from that?

And so you get this trade-off

whereby you're initially cautious,

then down the road,

you'll learn more because of the so-called

damages done to the economy.

And then at that point in time,

you will continue with a caution

or on a small number of circumstances

you might actually decide
to be more bold because,

oh, climate change damage

wasn't quite as bad as I thought it was.

But those are the types of trade offs

and we're trying to confront here.

And what's really important
in the work that we do

is the fact that you think about these

outside the usual risk framework
that we're often taught

in economics classes, where what's risk?

So when we think about risk
and we do risk analysis,

those are situations in
which we know probabilities,

but we don't know outcomes—

coin flips, roll of the dice and the like.

If only uncertainties were that simple

if only they were that, but they're not.

I mean, we live in a complex environment.

So the first question has to do with

what is the right conceptualization?

What is the right model?

What is the right view of
the world going forward?

There's uncertainties about that.

And certainly work in statistics

has been designed to
address some of those.

But for a decision maker,

those are not gonna be fully resolved,

and so how do you do
appropriate sensitivity analyses

to kind of confront those?

And then the models we use,

our view of the worlds are simplified.

That's the only way we understand models

that through some form of
conceptualization, simplification.

The world's complex,

we need simplified lenses
to look through them.

How do we take those simple lenses

and use them in sensible ways

when you know they’re simplifications
at the end of the day?

So our work is important to think about

uncertainty much broader
than this kind of risk notion

that shows up in our
analysis of risk aversion

and risk prices and the like.

It's important to
conceptualize the uncertainties

in this more general framework.

And for things like pandemics,

for things like climate change,

I think these types of issues
become very important.

- I think that's really important

to separate that out.

There's a long tradition, of course,

at the University of Chicago,

because some of these ambiguities

are sometimes put on the
heading of Knightian uncertainty.

So Frank Knight, who was a
University of Chicago economist,

in the early part of the 20th century,

really tried to differentiate
between traditional risk

where you can kind of easily calculate out

the role of the dice,

you know exactly what
the probabilities are

and things where you're
not really quite sure.

There's a lot of uncertainty

that goes beyond just
the simple risk measures.

- Yeah, Knight in fact, was...

Book was very interesting in that regard.

He's very good at identifying the problem,

but when it comes to thinking
through how to approach it,

there the book is kind of the struggles,

but we're talking about
a book that was written

like almost a century ago.

And it's interesting at the same time,

Knight was wrestling with those questions.

In some sense, Keynes was as well.

It was not just Knight. It was Knight and Keynes

in some sense, but yeah.

Thinking about them in
kind of different ways,

this notion that we really
need to confront uncertainty

in broader terms.

So yes, Knight's a great
motivator there for sure.

Absolutely.

So, thank you for bringing that up.

- Sure.

And so what are some of the results,

I've been getting to exactly that

because we wanna try to get to

sort of practical implications.

So how do you then think about that of,

what are some of your findings

of how you deal with this uncertainty?

- Yeah, so there's this
very interesting trade off

that comes up here.

And I kind of saw this play out
in real time over the pandemic.

Of course, the pandemic’s modeling

and implications played out
at a much faster timescale

than climate change,

but you would see these model predictions

that would come out

and model predictions sometimes
give you best guesses.

So here's my model, here's
what I think is gonna happen.

But models also can
tell you adverse things

that could happen.

And sometimes when people use models

they’re not clear about
how they're using them.

Are they using them to
give you the best guess

about what's gonna happen,

or are they using them
to give you a warning

about what adverse things could happen.

And the key trade-off here
is how you trade that off

between your best guesses of the future,

versus your concerns about what bad

might happen going forward.

And so that's where,

again, decision theory kind of offers

nice conceptualizations for this.

As an economist, I can't tell policymakers

how averse they ought to
be to these bad outcomes,

but the book has really helped them

understand that trade off

between best guesses and
possible bad outcomes.

But how averse society
should be to uncertainty

or how averse businesses
should be to uncertainty

is of course, then...

It has to do with business
making preferences,

or policymaker preferences.

- Mm-hmm (affirmative), and so let's say,

because I think that's exactly right.

I mean, we have elected
officials in some sense

to make these social choice trade-offs,

how important are certain things,

where should resources be allocated?

But let's say that the political process

has given you those
sorts of social choices,

but then how do you help the policymakers

kind of think through these
issues and dealing with that.

So (indistinct) were a certain amount,

we have a certain amount of risk aversion,

but then what do we do about that?

And then turn that into policy choices.

- Yeah.

So the way that that type of

calculations or approaches work,

I would love to have some white board

and produce a lot of

beautiful, elegant mathematics,

but I will spare you with that for today.

But there's ways to think about this

in terms of when you're looking

about these uncertainties,

you use the models and the calculations

to figure out what you're
potentially guarding against.

So we can tell you about how,

as you change certain aversions,

here's really what's concerning
you at the end of the day.

Here's the thing,

I want you to think of

the outcome of the scenarios

that are of biggest concern to you.

And so those can reveal yet,

and then you can kind of
inspect those and say,

"Wow, should I be worried
about this or not?"

And so you can start asking,

from these methods,

what leads to the biggest
concern of the decision-maker?

So imagine you've got uncertainties

of a whole bunch of lot
complexity, and dimensions,

and the like,

our aim is to reduce that down

to do something very, very small scale

about the ones here are
the most troubling ones.

And that's an issue
about how much you wanna

be concerned about those.

So the type of methods
and calculations we do

are all about that type of reduction.

- I see.

That's really, really valuable.

Just some thoughts on what
some of those dimensions are,

whether it's sort of
like the timescale issues

or whether it's sort of broader
risk issues of interactions

between climate and financial risk.

Do you have a thought on
how you would reduce...

Well, what you would focus on?

What are the issues that
you tell the policymakers

to focus on?

- Yeah, that's obviously
a very important question.

In my own research,

we focus much more on the
fundamental uncertainties

that are out there and this, in terms of,

all the way for potential new
technologies to help us out,

to crossing environmental
thresholds and the like.

There's other forms of uncertainty.

And I think about this in the context

of central bank policy too,

since central banks are
concerned about issues

of climate change,

which I'm happy to talk
more about subsequently,

but one of the things
that firms have to face

is unfortunately, policy uncertainty.

So when it comes to climate change, yes,

things like weather
patterns are important,

but for the private sector, unfortunately,

they're having to speculate
what policy changes

will be coming down the road.

And so sometimes I think central banks

are stuck in this position

worried about the types of uncertainties

that are potentially induced elsewhere

by governmental activities,

which is something I think
they don't like to talk about.

But to some extent, that's
what some of their institutions

that they're regulating are based on.

So both these transitional issues,

as well as policy
uncertainty are things which

are very important to both private sector

and to central bank policy.

- Great.

And so in some sense,

what would you say sort
of is your bottom line

and actually that, this may
be an audience question

had come in in advance

and this might be a little bit unfair,

but I'll see how...

If you want to defer,
that's perfectly fine,

but to kind of bring this
into sort of practice,

someone said, one of the questions was,

if you were advising a
policymaker on how to allocate,

let's say, a very large sum of money,

let's say up to a hundred
billion dollars a year

related to climate,
where would you focus it?

- Yeah.

So I guess there's two places

that would come to mind,

and we're right now trying
to work out the trade-offs,

we're trying to figure out trade-offs

between such alternative policies.

One is how much social
investment we wanna make

in developing new green technologies.

And then of course, as you know,

once your governments get involved,

they can take resources
allocated for this purpose

and kind of start…

re-shifting them in kind of
unproductive direction.

So as we wanna think about
allocating resources towards

R&D developing new green technologies,

we also have to do this in a way

in which we have sensible decision makers

making the call on what
are the more productive

type of investments to be made there.

I'm always nervous when we
make governmental officials,

the green social venture capitalists here,

but sometimes, I think putting
resources into green venture capitalism

can be very valuable.

And then I do think like making policies

that changed people's incentives,
like taxation policies

connected to carbon
emissions, can be important.

Now, as we know there's very,

very big political issues that show up.

We saw France, various different protests

once we start putting in
various gasoline taxes

and the like.

At the same time,

we wanna think about this
like carbon taxation.

You have to think about
what you're gonna do

with the revenues.

And you have to think about

what the distributional
consequences are of things,

which is, it's not just like
putting a carbon tax out there.

It's important what you
do with the revenues

and how you make sure
the burdens of the tax

are shared appropriately.

So those are the two type of activities

that I find potentially most useful.

- Great, I think that's really helpful.

Mili, I wanna turn to you next,

because you've done a lot
of work on thinking about

the allocation of capital
and what the implications

of all of this uncertainty

are for strategic capital allocation

and Lars had made reference to that.

So maybe you could talk about

a little bit of your work there,

and if you're giving advice
to people thinking about

how to best allocate capital.

So in some sense,

it's a variation on that question

that could come in from the audience

of how you would allocate

the hundred billion dollars a year.

What sort of answer would you give?

What framework would you use

and how would you approach that?

- Sure, Randy, and it was
really good to hear from Lars,

how we can actually make
uncertainty more discreet

and most models are currently
not incorporating uncertainty,

but there is a lot of uncertainty
around the climate system,

the emission system,

and then the feedback
from the emission system.

And then there is uncertainty
around the actions

the different economic
agents are willing to take

when it comes to carbon
pricing, climate policies,

and different responses.

And as an investor,

you really need to think
about certain implications

on different macroeconomic variables,

such as GDP, rate, inflation,
but it will be path dependent,

but two degrees scenario

could lead to a radically
different growth or decline rates.

And some institutions are forecasting

for example, that Canada
will be a net beneficiary.

And some are showing
that we will see 3

to 4% GDP decline.

And there's just so much variability.

Also when it comes to carbon pricing,

carbon pricing can have
inflationary or deflationary effects

depending on different responses.

So how should we really
deal with this uncertainty

as investors and asset allocators?

Well, capital market assumptions

that most investors really use

when they think about their strategic allocation,

they really rely on a single scenario,

and you have to be very
explicit about your assumptions

and then take a very deterministic view.

And a lot of practitioners

are really not incorporating model

and parameter uncertainty,
which Lars just talked about

and at least not explicitly.

They can think about it,

but it's not currently
really incorporated.

And a lot of them are now
trying to model the climate

risks and opportunities
by simply adjusting returns

and volatility expectations

by simply stressing
certain macro variables,

and we just mentioned how we can see

such significant divergences

and they can go really wrong
if you just approach it

in a very linear way,

as Lars was mentioning.

So climate financial scenarios

now really must provide an interface

between transition scenarios
and financial risk models.

So we really need to think
about expanding the stream [indistinct].

And this may sound daunting,

but you can use built-in scenarios

from their national energy
agency, from NGFs, from SSP,

there are quite a few,

and they could be imported into different

financial risks models

to really be a lot more comprehensive.

And then investors can choose
between different scenarios

and select pathways

that can align with their own
implementation capabilities.

If you're a long-haul
investor, a long-short,

if you have different
liquidity constraints.

And what we would advocate

is that you really think
about combining both top-down

and bottom-up approaches,

and we just mentioned
some top-down scenarios.

And also regarding bottom-up techniques,
645
00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:29,720
we can expand our cashflow modeling

to look at physical and transition risks

and to also do sensitivity analysis,

not just related to your cash flows,

but also you can do that
sensitivity for each line item

below the operating line.

And that is a lot more comprehensive.

And then it can build your distributions

and simulate different states of the world

and incorporate that into your risk model.

And we provide training to
different investment managers.

We actually frequently
talk about Lars' work

and to really formalize that uncertainty

and to be a lot more comprehensive.

And then finally diversification
becomes even more important.

An investor can expand their toolkit

and invest in our new asset classes

that are part of the solution,

so we can avoid large asset impairments,

for example, carbon markets,

and I'm talking about regulated
carbon markets, not offsets.

Given there's a lot of
uncertainty around carbon pricing,

you can own carbon allowances
and then potentially mitigate

some of the losses that
you could be incurring

because your cause base
will be increasing

if you own larger matters.

And this is also a great tool
to achieve climate goals.

You can also invest in
adaptation and mitigation,

nature-based solutions,

renewable infrastructure
in emerging markets,

and different asset classes,

to really expand your toolkit
and think more broadly

about certain assets
that were not considered

asset classes before, that
were not investible before.

And that the way you're really investing

in climate solutions
and turning some risks

into opportunities and
diversifying in this really

radically uncertain world.

- Great, I think that's very helpful

in sort of translating this

into a framework for practical investment.

And Sir Ronnie, I wanted
to bring you in now

because you have done so much work

on trying to get that data together

and to think about how do we
measure these issues of impact

because of course, we can't
translate the framework

that Lars and Mili were talking about

into something practical without data.

So how have you thought about that?

What kind of filters have you used?

How do you approach the issue
of getting data about impact?

- So, first of all, let me say, Randy,

this is a really great pleasure
to exchange views with you,

with Lars, with Mili, with Caroline,

and with everybody from
the University of Chicago.

University of Chicago is a university

I owe a great debt to

because most people don't realize

that the existence of venture capital,

where I made my career really came

from the measurement of risk.

And the measurement of risk
was of course, in the '50s,

the area where Chicago brought
this massive contribution,

which brought to the concept
of risk adjusted returns,

the concept of diversification,

changed the investment portfolios

to include venture capital on
private equity, and investment

in emerging markets.

So you could argue that
the measurement of risk,

which the University of
Chicago brought to the world,

funded the tech revolution
and globalization.

I see the same thing
with regard to impact.

The measurement of impact today

is the tool which is going
to shift our whole economies

from risk return to
risk return and impact.

And there are three major forces
that are driving this then,

and I'm going to answer your
question directly about climate

and the work we've been doing in it.

But I think it's important for us all

to realize that there are
three major forces acting

in the world to improve it today.

The first is a massive change
of values, where young people

like many on this webinar,

refuse to purchase the
products of certain companies,

refuse to work for them.

And this has become perceived
by wider population,

and it hasn't been lost on the investors

who are now channeling $40 trillion plus

of ESG investment to achieve
impact as well as profit.

So this is massive,

this is half of all
professionally managed assets

in asset management firms.

It's not a passing thing.

The second massive change
occurring to improve the world

is leaps in technology.

When you look at what
artificial intelligence,

machine learning, augmented reality,

the genome and computing
coming together, blockchain do,

they effectively enable us
to deliver impact globally

in ways that humanity could
never previously contemplate.

And the third major force
is that this technology

enables us today to
measure in a granular way,

thanks to big computing power

and the availability of big data,

the impacts that companies
create on climate,

on the planet, and on people.

Now, it occurred to me a few years ago

that if we don't have reliable data,

that businesses and investors can use

in their decision making,

then we're not gonna
achieve the goal of shifting

our economists to risk return impact.

And so I helped to initiate

an effort at Harvard Business School

called the Impact Weighted
Accounts Initiative.

And it gives us a peek into the future.

We'd published the climate
impact of 3000 public companies

across the world in monetary terms

using the metrics that have been around,

that Lars has been looking
at in all of his work

and Mili has been working with,

and we have applied monetization
pounds to these metrics.

And here are the insights that you get.

Out of these 3000 companies,

450 deliver more
environmental damage in a year

than they do profit.

A thousand deliver environmental damage

equivalent to a quarter
or more of their profits.

Together they deliver $4 trillion worth

of environmental damage in a single year.

And most interestingly,

and this is a very deep insight,

which explains why as Caroline was saying,

in the green room,

many people, including students at Booth,

feel that impact accounting
is a foregone conclusion.

And the insight is this,
within many sectors,

you now see a correlation
between higher pollution

and lower stock market values.

So the weight of ESG money

is affecting the valuations
of the companies.

And so regulators are not surprisingly

focusing on impact transparency.

IOSCO, which groups the
world's regulators together,

is pushing hard for climate transparency.

IFRS, which is responsible
for all the accounting

across the world,

is hopefully going to
announce the establishment

of a sustainable
accounting standards board,

moving us in the direction of

generally accepted impact
principles, and so on.

So the crucial step
that we need to take now

is for governments to
mandate impact transparency,

which I believe is going
to be similar to GAAP.

It's gonna be GAIP,

Generally Accepted Impact Principles,

and it's gonna parallel

what the Roosevelt Administration
did in 1933 and '34,

when investors realized

that they had no transparency on profit,

because there were no accepted
accounting principles.

There were no auditors.

Companies could put a share of that profit

into hidden reserves without
telling shareholders.

And today we're at a similar crossroads,

40 trillion is going to achieve impact

with no transparency on the impact.

- That's very interesting.

And I think in some sense, I mean,

another way of thinking about

what you're doing with
risk return and impact

is effectively trying to suss
out what is the externality

and what is the external impact.

So rather than something narrowly,

just looking at the
traditional calculations

of profit and loss,

but we know that there can be
externalities from activities

and so producing carbon
and that can have impact

on the environment and
other sorts of impacts.

And so actually I wanna
first come back to Lars

to think about that because

in some of your work on uncertainty,

you thought about this issue

of trying to encompass the externalities.

So how do you see

what Ronnie just spoke about
as being a way to be helpful

in trying to address some of the issues

that you have raised,

and then Mili, I wanna come back to you,

because Ronnie also mentioned
something very interesting

about the market impacts,

and I know that you've done
some very interesting work

on how the markets seem to be repricing

based on these externalities,

based on these impacts.

But first, Lars,

let's think about kind of
the theoretical framework

thinking about the externalities

and then Mili kind of the practical,

how was this affecting asset prices?

- Yeah, so the work that I've
been doing has been focused

more on the so-called
social cost of carbon.

It used to be that pre-Trump,

the EPA would post these numbers

for the social cost of
carbon on their website,

which was supposed to be used
in policy making purposes.

During the Trump administration
it got pulled down,

now they're being put back up again.

It's pretty frustrating to open the hood

of how those numbers are produced.

Yes, it looks impressive superficially,

but once you open the hood on it,

you can start seeing a fair
bit of skepticism there

in terms of their construction.

And in many cases, they
were kind of rushed

to put numbers out there
for regulatory purposes

that I think were almost
counterproductive.

At one point in time,

when I was thinking about writing a paper about,

will you tell me what the
social cost of carbon number is,

and I can manufacture
the other way to get it.

So we're still figuring
out good ways to do this,

reliably for uncertainty.

And most of those measurements
really treated uncertainty

in very, very casual and
pretty much sloppy ways.

So I do think this kind of going from data

to useful quantifications
is an important task.

I think we've got a ways to go.

I think there's much stuff
that we can do to improve it.

And I get nervous when I see
numbers posted on EPA webpages

that are just not well thought out.

So I hope going forward,

we can put a lot more
effort into thinking through

how to do this in open and very
conceptually appealing ways.

Data richness is obviously

very, very important going forward,

and I'm a full believer
in that data richness.

I also think we have
conceptualization issues,

which are absolutely first order as well,

and then putting these things together

to get meaningful notions of social costs,

I think are really important.

In terms of private sector responses,

so I'm all in favor of
kind of getting better

and richer data,

and I think it's also
important that we open the hood

on how these social metrics
were actually constructed.

The other thing I found
really interesting here,

is related to Mili's comments.

She was talking about the
naive use of scenarios,

which I'm completely on board with.

And this has spun all the way
over to central bank policy.

They're putting out these
deterministic climate,

statically specified climate scenarios

over a period of 30 years

and asking financial institutions

to do something with them.

And the type of scenarios,
as Mili indicated,

it's really important to take
those static notion scenarios

and make them dynamic and
in some sense probabilistic.

And this shows up in social
cost of carbon measurements.

People use scenarios
quite a bit there as well.

And they'll put on emission scenarios.

And the example I like to think of,

let's think about an
emission scenario going forward.

Suppose we're uncertain about
the damages going forward.

The plausibility of that
scenario is gonna depend on

the amount of damages which
we incur in the future,

because there's gonna be some type

of endogenous policy responses.

So we have to think
about this dynamically.

We can't think about plausible scenarios

without simultaneously
thinking about how information

is gonna be revealed
about them in the future

and at least thinking about them

in kind of probabilistic terms.

So thinking both dynamically
and probabilistically,

I think it's really important

and it's critical

not only for private
sector decision making,

but also for social decision-making

to go beyond deterministic scenarios.

- Yeah, I think that's super important

and it's super important to
have the best data possible.

And that's why I think
Sir Ronnie's approach

of trying to sort of do
it from the bottom up

of company by company
seems to be something

that is valuable,

and I know that the Rustandy Center is

working with Harvard and
also working with Wharton

on trying to get these
kinds of measures together,

and we can't make good decisions
unless we have good data.

But Mili, I now want to come to you,

again, building off of
what Sir Ronnie

was talking about,

how were the markets pricing

in the different climate scenarios?

How are they taking into
account these externalities,

if they are?

- Of course, and the
market already started

to re-price quite substantially

and the National Energy Agency and I

are now working on four reports

looking at the power sector

and really how that is repricing

based on certain climate variables

and macroeconomic variables.

And the market really started repricing

something that is a
little bit more obvious.

Renewables have significantly
outperformed fossil fuels

in the last five years,
in the last 10 years

even during certain periods
when their fundamental metrics

were not really favorable.

So when we looked at
different credit conditions

and different factors that
influence their performance

very frequently we were quite surprised

by the response function.

And also they have showed a
striking degree of resilience

during the pandemic

despite the fact that they’re
lower market cap, high leverage,

low profitability, and everyone
who worked in this report

was really surprised by this response

because their standard attributes

simply wouldn't warrant
the kind of behavior.

So there is this
significant repricing based

and some forward-looking expectations

that they will have to grow

three to four times and align

with some recommendations.

And I really like how Sir Ronnie mentioned

this third dimension of
returns, which is impact.

Some of that could be explained,

this out performance that
is not linked to standard

asset pricing attributes that we know,

that we understand, risk returns,

and all factor in composition,

that our performance could be
driven by this impact factor,

and this need for them
to grow substantially.

That is when it comes to the power sector,

and also the market is not just repricing

fossil fuels and renewables,

but it's also now starting to
price certain externalities,

and certain companies within let's say,

utilities or chemicals,

they're already seeing
really significant dispersion

between companies within different sectors

that are not your obvious beneficiaries

from the energy transition.

You're seeing that dispersion
that is also linked

to certain externalities.

And also within certain sectors,

such as utilities, NextEra, US utility,

now is about four times the mark.

Again, there was just
a few, a year or so ago.

So you were seeing within sectors

that really huge dispersion in
terms of the role they play,

and also certain externalities

that are associated with their operations.

And the market is also
telling us that decarbonizing

doesn't have to be a negative NPV event.

And there's this impact dimension

that I fully agree with Sir Ronnie

that is becoming even more critical

and it seems that the market

is repricing based that dimension as well.

- Well, that's very interesting

because the usual concern is that,

and the standard issue with externalities

is the market typically
doesn't price them,

and that you need to
have intervention

in order to get the pricing right,

because the markets will
ignore those externalities.

It's very interesting

the research that you're
doing that suggests

that at least to some extent,

I don’t wanna say by any means perfectly,

because as we were just discussing,

there's a lot of uncertainty

about the extent of these externalities,

some of that does seem to be coming

into market pricing.

There's an interesting
question that came in.

We've got a lot of interesting
questions that came in,

about potential tension
between Sir Ronnie's approach

and Lars' approach.

And so I'll read parts of the question.

When one prepares the traditional
GAAP accounting statements,

isn't there a lot of
uncertainty about labor costs,

capital expenditures,
and traditional issues,

issues of depreciation?

And so do you see greater uncertainties

or similar uncertainties of trying

to think about the broader impact issues,

'cause of course there's
a lot of imprecision

in traditional accounting also.

So I don't know, Sir Ronnie, Lars,

maybe, yeah, Sir Ronnie maybe you start.

- Yeah, no, I'd love to jump in there

and you're absolutely right.

We make judgments all the time

on the sorts of issues
that you've mentioned.

A revenue recognition
for software companies

is another major area,

recognition of the value of leases,

and an accounting system
is a living organism.

And there are changes
to accounting rules

on the monthly basis.

And the same is going to be true

of impact accounting principles.

Now, we've tried to make
some assumptions about costs,

the cost of carbon that we've used, Lars.

For example, in the calculations

that I mentioned is $300 a ton.

We're not saying this is the right price.

We're simply saying,
based on what we've read,

we think this is a defensible price.

We need to get an
intelligent group of people

around the table,

as we did when we defined
the initial GAAP principles,

and to agree of the price should be.

And so the process of establishing GAIP

is one of beginning to agree,
what are the right metrics?

What are the right paths to monetization?

And it's not gonna be a
100 percent perfect

and we shouldn't expect
more of impact accounting

than we do of financial accounting,
where people are asking,

can we measure every
single type of impact?

And the answer is no.
We can measure though,

the crucial ones,

certainly where climate and
diversity are concerned,

gender equality, differences
in pay, and so on.

We can do that.

So we have a robust approach

in my view, but we need
consistency of data.

We need consistency of data

and only governments can mandate them.

- Lars, what are your thoughts?

- Sure.

So I'm certainly all in
about the data part of this.

I think that's absolutely critical.

It's vital to … going forward.

The thing I wanna emphasize
again is this translating data

into social values.

I think it was a very
important thing to be doing.

And I'm talking about the
difficulties in doing that,

I don't mean to say we
therefore shouldn't do it.

But to my case,

there's not been a whole
lot of transparency

in the conceptualizations
and modeling aspects of it,

which I know from my own calculations

can be very highly sensitive

to how you want to
conceptualize this stuff.

So the openness has to be more
than just on the data side,

but how we map that data
in meaningful measures,

of say the social measure in
terms of social evaluations.

So I do that as a very important task.

I'm all in

that we should be having important
conversations about that.

I just wanna make it clear

that that's hardly something
that that's a settled issue now

within the context of climate change.

And so I will look forward to
having further conversations

about this very important topic.

But the transparency
idea is also important

is how we map from data
into social values.

- One of the questions that
had come in earlier was

thinking about incentives.

How do we get the right incentives

for getting the right disclosure?

And then using that in
a systematic way to get

to good policy outcomes,

anyone who wants to jump in on that?

- Perhaps I can jump in, Randy.

It seems to me when you get
this sort of transparency

on impact, you shift
to a fairer tax system.

We're already beginning
to talk of a carbon tax,

as Lars has been a saying,

based on the cost of carbon.

But we will be able to do
that for other social issues,

like diversity and so on, if
governments choose to do that.

So one incentive can be taxation,

but I actually think that transparency

provides a massive incentive,

if indeed there's a correlation
between impact performance

and company valuation,

as Mili was illustrating.

So the transparency itself
would create a race to the top.

- Mili, Lars, do you wanna hop in?

(talking over each other)

- I'm sorry.

- Go ahead, go ahead, Mili.

- Thank you.

That transparency and actually
we wrote a paper about this,

that that transparency we
provide proper benchmarking,

and not just more data,
but very consistent data,

and no firm wants to be
the dirtiest on the block.

And when you have very
consistent metrics across sectors

and then create a proper benchmarking,

that competition, the role of competition

can be extremely powerful.

And one of the things that we are advising

is every company needs

to show their breakdown
of capital expenditures

and all matches that are relevant
for each specific sector.

And the market will price accordingly.

And I think role of
transparency of competition

can be extremely powerful.

- Lars.

- Yeah, I'm not sure I have
a whole lot more to add.

I certainly could read the
transparency can open the door

to better tax systems for sure.

And we're still struggling
with how to make carbon taxes

implemented in ways

that could be politically feasible

and it's quite possible that transparency

can help us to achieve that aim,

so that I would be all in.

- We had some questions

that came in about cap and trade.

Do you think that's the most effective way

to try to deal with these issues?

Anyone wanna jump in on that?

- So, yeah, part of, I think
where cap and trade

becomes interesting as an
alternative to straight taxes

is once we start looking
across countries

and putting a uniform tax across countries

seems like that without
some type of reallocation

of so-called property rights
is probably not gonna...

It becomes very problematic.

And so maybe we start
thinking about more like cap

and trade systems as we start looking

across various different
regions of the world.

I think that's a tremendously
challenging problem,

how we coordinate
policies across countries.

And there, I think cap and trade becomes

interesting to add to the conversation.

- Mili, Sir Ronnie, do you want to chime in?

- I don't have anything
to add, I'm afraid.

- And related to that...

Oh, I'm sorry, Mili.

- I fully agree with Lars.

- And related to this issue,

we had a number of questions
come in about emerging markets

versus developed countries.

And how do you get

the incentives right across the globe,

because Sir Ronnie,

I assume most of your focus is probably

on developed county companies,

and so how do we expand this?

How do we get the issues
that Lars was talking about

to sort of get something that
encompasses the whole globe,

because there are many
emerging market countries.

So a country like China,
which is an enormous

emitter of CO2,

and without getting a
country like China on board,

it doesn't seem that it's
gonna be very effective.

A lot of the other work that that's done

may not have that much of an impact,

but getting a country like
China and many emerging markets

on board would be really important.

- It’s really amazing to
see how financial markets

are an ally in bringing these changes about.

I don't know how many people
on this webinar are aware

that there's now one-half
trillion dollars of green social

and sustainable bonds in the world.

But within that pool of one-half trillion,

10% sustainability linked to bonds,

where your rate of interest
as a corporate borrower falls

if you achieve certain social
or environmental objectives.

So Novartis, for example,

and this begins to answer
your question directly

on the emerging markets,

issued a 1.8 billion euro
sustainability linked bond,

where it's rate of interest falls

if its drugs reach a
certain percentage...

If a certain percentage of its sales

reach vulnerable populations,

that could be in emerging market
or in developed countries.

Similarly, Enel, the Italian utility,

has issued seven billion euros worth

of sustainability linked bonds,

where it's rate of interest falls

if it achieves certain
environmental targets.

So I think these pay for success bonds

are ways of actually using
impact to guide capital

to emerging markets.

And when you begin to
have the transparency

we're talking about,

investors can reward companies
whose sales and investments

are growing in emerging markets

versus those that are only
serving well-off populations

in developed countries for example.

- Mili, Lars.

- I think this is such an
important topic, really.

And if you look at all,
not just government,

but also corporate flows,

and all corporate really flows
are extremely concentrated

in developed markets.

Even if you look at some sectors

that are part of the solutions,
which is renewable energy,

we have built our portfolios
that include emerging

and frontier markets.

And then when we looked at
actually capital flows

that are going, they are
just really concentrated

and invested into 20 to 30 companies,

and none of them are in emerging markets.

And I really do think that
investors now need to think about

how they're channeling their
flows more holistically.

And I totally understand
that you're dealing

with some effects, risks,
that you're not used to,

that it's difficult to hedge,

but that investment is required.

And I think the investors

need to have a slightly different mindset

and be more open-minded about
different kinds of risk forms

and managing them and
to still channel capital

towards certain areas that
really needed desperately

and that are going to be
a part of the solution

and actually their national energy agency

are just not working

on our renewable infrastructure reporting

in emerging markets.

And we are really struggling to find

enough projects to study,

much less capital flows
going in that direction,

and that is going to be the
topic of our next report

and how do we really
think about this universe

and some capital flow
constraints that both regulators

and investors need to address.

- Lars, did you wanna chime in?

- Only a little bit,

but certainly impact on capital flows

can be important here for sure.

But I do think that China
and India and elsewhere,

issues about climate change
are very, very important ones.

I mean, certainly the developed economies

have had their day in terms of bidding

and leading to environmental degradation,

so it doesn't put us in a great position

with some of these developing countries

in terms of getting them to
initiate important policies

to address climate change.

So I think that's an important
challenge going forward

as to how we structure the incentive...

How we as a world help to
provide good incentives

for developing countries.

- Excellent.

I think it's a great way to end,

because we're just a few minutes
past the top of the hour.

I think it's been a
super great discussion.

I mean, it got I think the key issues

of how do we think conceptually about

this very important issue

that has a lot of uncertainty around it?

What does it mean for policy?

What does it mean for
practical investment choices?

What does that mean for data collection?

So I think it's very
interesting to see how

we seem to have a change
from the tradition

of the way people think about markets

as not pricing externalities

and some of the work that Mili has done

to suggest that they are and consistent

with what Sir Ronnie is saying

that these are important issues

where people are going to
be disclosing around them,

and it is going to have an impact

on the returns for investors,

on the cost of capital.

And so it's a very, very interesting

set of both conceptual
and empirical issues.

And I think we've made a lot of progress,

and I really, really
appreciate the contributions

from Lars, Mili, Sir Ronnie

on both the research work you've done,

the practical work that you were doing,

and obviously there's
a lot more to be done,

and hopefully we will
have some of these ideas

that you're talking about be
integrated into the COP26,

that is coming up next week.

So thank you very much,

and thank you all for
the amazing questions

that you sent in in advance.

And during the section,

I could only get to a
small fraction of them,

but it shows the high level of engagement

on these super important issues.

Thanks so much.

Bye-bye.

- Thank you, Randy.

- Thank you.
- Bye, everyone.

Loaded: 0%
Progress: 0%
Mute
Current Time 0:00
/
Duration Time 0:00
Stream TypeLIVE
Remaining Time -0:00
 
Future of Capitalism - The Climate Challenge

Best Guesses and Possible Bad Outcomes

Decision theory formalizes two important trade-offs pertaining to uncertainty and climate policy, suggests Hansen, whose joint research on pricing uncertainty and climate change recently won the 2021 Review of Financial Studies Michael J. Brennan Best Paper Award. Quantitative models can be used to make best guesses and to explore possible bad outcomes for society. How do we trade off such considerations?

“Imagine you’ve got many dimensions to the uncertainties reflected in a quantitative model,” Hansen said. “The aim of our research is to reduce that down into something very small scale—to say, ‘These are the most troubling ones.’”

While decision theory formalizes trade-offs between best guesses and possible bad outcomes, it is up to decision-makers to decide how averse they are to the latter, Hansen said. This aversion is then reflected in prudent policy making.

The Trade-Off between Waiting and Acting Now

The second trade-off is dynamic in nature, Hansen said. Since we are uncertain about the quantitative magnitude of damages, we could either wait until we witness some of the possibly severe consequences of climate change, or we can act now based on the possibility of such severe consequences—because it is arguably less costly to address climate change now. Down the road there may be good news (consequences are not as dramatic as we feared), or bad news (indeed, some of worst fears are realized). Such a trade-off is absent in many simplistic analyses of climate change uncertainty, Hansen added. Decision theory gives a framework for thinking in such dynamic terms.

“While better data can help us cope with some aspects of uncertainty, data alone is not sufficient,” Hansen said. “The slogan ‘evidence-based policy’ is a common refrain, but to interpret the evidence and use it in policy analyses requires a conceptual framework, a formal model or a set of such models. This is particularly true in the case of climate change as we consider pushing economies into places that have not been experienced with data.”

A More Comprehensive Formulation of Uncertainty

As Hansen argues, there are good reasons to think of climate change using broader notions of uncertainty than is typical in risk assessment models. Model-based risk assessments typically feature uncertain outcomes with known, model-generated probabilities. But to assess exposure to climate change, there is uncertainty as to which model predictions to feature and how to cope with their stylized and simplified nature.

Hansen has used decision theory to work through analyses that account for uncertainty conceptualized in broader terms. For example, the social cost of carbon might be calculated much like an asset in a dividend stream. When emissions go into the atmosphere, there are social consequences that can be calculated immediately and into the future. Much like in investment theory, uncertainty plays a central role in social valuation.

Technology and Transparency

A traditional economic trade-off is risk versus return. Cohen, who is widely considered the father of impact investment, believes that climate change is a key factor in the evolution of that trade-off to risk versus return versus impact.

There’s been a shift in values, Cohen said, with many younger consumers now refusing to purchase from or work with corporations that aren’t climate friendly. This has swayed more investors to funnel billions into environmental, social, and corporate governance trends.

Technology is making climate transparency easier, which Cohen believes will put a greater focus on impact. For example, Cohen points to the Impact-Weighted Accounts Initiative (IWAI), a project he helped launch at Harvard Business School that has examined the climate impact of 3,000 public companies and continues to measure the impacts of companies. The IWAI’s findings suggest that 450 of these companies deliver more environmental damage than they do profit, amounting to $4 trillion worth of environmental damage in a single year.

With this information being so readily transparent and available, impact accounting is now a “foregone conclusion,” Cohen said.

“Within many sectors, you now see a correlation between higher pollution and lower stock market values,” Cohen said. “The weight of ESG money is affecting the valuations of companies. Regulators are, not surprisingly, focusing on impact transparency. The crucial next step is for governments to mandate impact transparency.”

Financial and Climate Risk

At Imperial College London, Fomicov has explored climate uncertainty and the strategic allocation of capital. She’s found that many investors model climate risks by simply stressing certain macro variables. They generally don’t incorporate model uncertainty, which, as Hansen, explained, can go wrong.

Rather than take such a linear approach, climate financial scenarios should provide an interface between transition scenarios and financial risk models, Fomicov said. It may sound daunting, but she notes that investors can import built-in scenarios.

“Investors can choose between different scenarios and select pathways that align with their assessment and their implementation capabilities, for instance, whether they’re long-only or long-short investors, or if they have different liquidity constraints,” Fomicov said. “That is a lot more comprehensive. Investors can build various distributions and simulate different states of the world and incorporate that into their risk model.”

Investors should also further diversify their risks. Investing in carbon allowances, nature-based solutions, or renewable infrastructures in emerging markets, for example, could be great for the climate and investors alike. This is also a great way to achieve climate goals, Fomicov added.

“You’re investing in climate solutions and turning some risks into opportunities and diversifying in this radically uncertain world,” she said.

More Stories from Chicago Booth

Email icon

Booth News & Events to Your Inbox

Stay informed with Booth's newsletter, event notifications, and regular updates featuring faculty research and stories of leadership and impact.

YOUR PRIVACY
We want to demonstrate our commitment to your privacy. Please review Chicago Booth's privacy notice, which provides information explaining how and why we collect particular information when you visit our website.