Raghuram G. Rajan

Rethinking Fiscal and Monetary Policy for the New Economy
Date Posted:Mon, 03 Jul 2023 12:06:50 -0500
The pandemic-induced lockdowns and the global recession of 2020 that followed have created a highly uncertain global outlook. Globalization is stalling, social cohesion is being eroded by unrest and political polarization, and the still-unfolding economic crisis is threatening the livelihoods of those at the lower end of the income spectrum. As existing temporary support measures begin to expire in several countries, it will be of paramount importance to put in place the structural reforms that will help to build back not only better but also broader.

Finance and Climate Resilience: Evidence from the Long 1950s Us Drought
Date Posted:Mon, 19 Jun 2023 04:18:55 -0500
We study how the availability of credit shaped adaptation to the long 1950s US drought. We find that investment in irrigation increased substantially more in drought-exposed areas with access to bank finance. The spillover effects of farmers? ability to adapt to the drought through financing, thus preserving agricultural livelihoods, also lead to the greater survival of retail and manufacturing businesses. Overall, areas with greater access to financing suffered significantly less population decline, both in the short- and long term. Thus, enhancing access to finance can enable communities to adapt to large adverse climatic shocks, and limit migration.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Finance and Climate Resilience: Evidence from the long 1950s US Drought
Date Posted:Thu, 15 Jun 2023 16:52:57 -0500
We study how the availability of credit shapes adaptation to a climatic shock, specifically, the long 1950s US drought. We find that bank lending, net immigration, and population growth decline sharply in drought exposed areas with limited initial access to bank finance. In contrast, agricultural investment and long-run productivity increase more in drought-exposed areas when they have access to bank finance, even allowing some of these areas to leapfrog otherwise similar areas in the subsequent decades. We also find unequal access to finance can drive migration from drought-hit finance-poor communities to finance-rich communities. These results suggest that broadening access to finance can enable communities to adapt to large adverse climatic shocks and reduce emigration.

Finance and Climate Resilience: Evidence from the Long 1950s US Drought
Date Posted:Thu, 08 Jun 2023 11:26:36 -0500
We study how the availability of credit shapes adaptation to a climatic shock, specifically, the long 1950s US drought. We find that bank lending, net immigration, and population growth decline sharply in drought exposed areas with limited initial access to bank finance. In contrast, agricultural investment and long-run productivity increase more in drought-exposed areas when they have access to bank finance, even allowing some of these areas to leapfrog otherwise similar areas in the subsequent decades. We also find unequal access to finance can drive migration from drought-hit finance-poor communities to finance-rich communities. These results suggest that broadening access to finance can enable communities to adapt to large adverse climatic shocks and reduce emigration.

Cross-Border Spillovers: How Us Financial Conditions Affect M&As Around the World
Date Posted:Mon, 22 May 2023 04:47:47 -0500
We find that financial conditions in the core have significant spillover effects on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). On average, a 1 percentage point easing of the IMF US Financial Conditions Index is associated with approximately a 10% higher volume of cross-border M&As. The spillovers are stronger for countries with more liabilities denominated in foreign currency (or in US dollars). We find that the spillovers are driven by changes in US financial conditions, rather than changes in Euro Area conditions. Deals that happen when financial conditions in the US are tighter (and therefore acquisitions fewer) add more value for the acquirers, as reflected in higher acquirer excess stock returns around the announcement.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders
Date Posted:Fri, 31 Mar 2023 17:43:22 -0500
Using natural language processing, we identify corporate goals stated in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated, from less than one on average in 1955 to more than 7 in 2020. While in 1955, profit maximization, market share growth, and customer service were dominant goals, today almost all companies proclaim social and environmental goals as well. We examine why firms announce goals and when. We find goal announcements are associated with management?s responses to the firm?s (possibly changed) circumstances, with the changing power and preferences of key constituencies, as well as from management?s attempts to deflect scrutiny. While executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on financial performance, we do observe a rise in bonus payments contingent on meeting social and environmental objectives. Firms that announce environmental and social goals tend to implement programs intended to achieve those goals, although their impact on outcomes is unclear. The evidence is consistent with firms focusing on shareholder interests while incorporating stakeholder interests as interim goals. Goals also do seem to be announced opportunistically to deflect attention and alleviate pressure on management.

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders
Date Posted:Mon, 27 Mar 2023 04:19:20 -0500
Using natural language processing, we identify corporate goals stated in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated, from less than one on average in 1955 to more than 7 in 2020. While in 1955, profit maximization, market share growth, and customer service were dominant goals, today almost all companies proclaim social and environmental goals as well. We examine why firms announce goals and when. We find goal announcements are associated with management?s responses to the firm?s (possibly changed) circumstances, with the changing power and preferences of key constituencies, as well as from management?s attempts to deflect scrutiny. While executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on financial performance, we do observe a rise in bonus payments contingent on meeting social and environmental objectives. Firms that announce environmental and social goals tend to implement programs intended to achieve those goals, although their impact on outcomes is unclear. The evidence is consistent with firms focusing on shareholder interests while incorporating stakeholder interests as interim goals. Goals also do seem to be announced opportunistically to deflect attention and alleviate pressure on management.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets
Date Posted:Mon, 20 Mar 2023 11:03:52 -0500
When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expands its balance sheet via quantitative easing, commercial banks finance their reserve holdings with demandable deposits, especially uninsured ones, and also issue lines of credit to corporations. These bank-issued claims on liquidity did not shrink when the Fed halted and eventually reversed its balance-sheet expansion in 2014-2019. Consequently, the financial sector, especially banks that increased their liquidity risk exposure more, became vulnerable to shocks. This in turn has necessitated further liquidity provision by the Fed, as witnessed in September 2019, March 2020, and March 2023, suggesting potential tradeoffs between unconventional monetary policy and financial stability.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets
Date Posted:Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:05:09 -0500
When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded its balance sheet via quantitative easing (QE), commercial banks financed reserve holdings with deposits and reduced their average maturity. They also issued lines of credit to corporations. However, when the Fed halted its balance-sheet expansion in 2014 and even reversed it during quantitative tightening (QT) starting in 2017, there was no commensurate shrinkage of these claims on liquidity. Consequently, the financial sector was left more sensitive to potential liquidity shocks, with weaker-capitalized banks most exposed. This necessitated Fed liquidity provision in September 2019 and again in March 2020. Liquidity-risk-exposed banks suffered the most drawdowns and the largest stock price declines at the onset of the Covid crisis in March 2020. The evidence suggests that the expansion and shrinkage of central bank balance sheets involves tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial stability.

Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets
Date Posted:Tue, 11 Oct 2022 17:57:18 -0500
When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded its balance sheet via quantitative easing (QE), commercial banks financed reserve holdings with deposits, especially uninsured ones, and reduced their average maturity. They also issued lines of credit to corporations. However, when the Fed halted its balance-sheet expansion in 2014 and even reversed it during quantitative tightening (QT) starting in 2017, there was no commensurate shrinkage of these claims on liquidity. Consequently, the financial sector was left more sensitive to potential liquidity shocks, with lower-capitalized banks most exposed. This necessitated Fed liquidity provision in September 2019 and again in March 2020. Liquidity-risk-exposed banks suffered the most drawdowns and the largest stock price declines at the onset of the Covid crisis in March 2020. The evidence suggests that the expansion and shrinkage of central bank balance sheets involves tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial stability, as also evidenced in recent banking stress and runs by uninsured bank depositors.

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use: Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 06 Sep 2022 10:45:03 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart increase in commercial bank liabilities, such as short-term deposits issued to finance reserves. Banks typically also write a variety of other claims on reserve holdings. These claims reduce the net future availability of liquidity to the system, dampening the normal effect of reserves in improving liquidity. In episodes of stress when a large fraction of claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can even exceed available reserves, made scarcer due to hoarding by some liquid commercial banks. Therefore, because central bank balance sheet expansion operates through commercial bank balance sheets, it need not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress, it may even exacerbate them. This may attenuate any positive monetary effects of reserve expansion on economic ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 06 Sep 2022 10:34:38 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart increase in commercial bank liabilities, such as short-term deposits issued to finance reserves. Banks typically also write a variety of other claims on reserve holdings. These claims reduce the net future availability of liquidity to the system, dampening the normal effect of reserves in improving liquidity. In episodes of stress when a large fraction of claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can even exceed available reserves, made scarcer due to hoarding by some liquid commercial banks. Therefore, because central bank balance sheet expansion operates through commercial bank balance sheets, it need not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress, it may even exacerbate them. This may attenuate any positive monetary effects of reserve expansion on economic ...

Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth When Government is Myopic and Self-interested
Date Posted:Thu, 11 Aug 2022 15:06:31 -0500
We examine how a sovereign?s ability to borrow abroad affects the country?s growth and steady state consumption, assuming that the government is both myopic and self-interested. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country?s access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government?s effective horizon as the government?s ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in incentivizing private production and savings despite its self-interest. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government?s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ?growth boost?, with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity and spending. This could lead to a ?growth trap? where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to external borrowing. We discuss the effectiveness of alternative debt policies, including declaring the sovereign?s debt ?odious?, debt relief, and debt ceilings.

New: When is Sovereign Debt Odious? A Theory of Government Repression, Growth Traps, and Growth Boosts
Date Posted:Thu, 11 Aug 2022 06:13:48 -0500
We examine the dynamics of a country’s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government is myopic and wants to maximize short-term, self-interested spending. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country’s access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government’s effective horizon; the government’s ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in generating future revenues. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a 'growth boost', with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity. This could lead to a 'growth trap' where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to debt. We discuss the effectiveness of ...

Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth When Government is Myopic and Self-Interested
Date Posted:Mon, 01 Aug 2022 04:54:11 -0500
We examine how a sovereign?s ability to borrow abroad affects the country?s growth and steady state consumption, assuming that the government is both myopic and self-interested. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country?s access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government?s effective horizon as the government?s ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in incentivizing private production and savings despite its self-interest. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government?s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ?growth boost", with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity and spending. This could lead to a ?growth trap? where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to external borrowing. We discuss the effectiveness of alternative debt policies, including declaring the sovereign?s debt ?odious?, debt relief, and debt ceilings.

REVISION: When is Sovereign Debt Odious? A Theory of Government Repression, Growth Traps, and Growth Boosts
Date Posted:Wed, 29 Jun 2022 09:04:06 -0500
We examine the dynamics of a country's growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government is myopic and wants to maximize short-term, self-interested spending. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country's access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government's effective horizon; the government's ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in generating future revenues. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government's effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ``growth boost", with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity. This could lead to a ``growth trap' where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to debt. We discuss the effectiveness of ...

REVISION: When is Sovereign Debt Odious? A Theory of Government Repression, Growth Traps, and Growth Boosts
Date Posted:Wed, 29 Jun 2022 09:03:48 -0500
We examine the dynamics of a country's growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government is myopic and wants to maximize short-term, self-interested spending. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country's access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government's effective horizon; the government's ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in generating future revenues. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government's effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ``growth boost", with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity. This could lead to a ``growth trap' where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to debt. We discuss the effectiveness of ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Wed, 27 Apr 2022 14:18:11 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart increase in commercial bank liabilities, such as short-term deposits issued to finance reserves. Banks typically also write a variety of other claims on reserve holdings. Normally, central bank balance sheet expansion will enhance the net future availability of liquidity to the system. However, in episodes of stress when a large fraction of claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly greater than the availability of reserves. Furthermore, at such times some liquid commercial banks may hoard reserves to bolster their own prospects, contributing significantly to liquidity shortages. Therefore, because central bank balance sheet expansion operates through commercial bank balance sheets, it need not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress, it ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use: Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Wed, 27 Apr 2022 14:18:03 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart increase in commercial bank liabilities, such as short-term deposits issued to finance reserves. Banks typically also write a variety of other claims on reserve holdings. Normally, central bank balance sheet expansion will enhance the net future availability of liquidity to the system. However, in episodes of stress when a large fraction of claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly greater than the availability of reserves. Furthermore, at such times some liquid commercial banks may hoard reserves to bolster their own prospects, contributing significantly to liquidity shortages. Therefore, because central bank balance sheet expansion operates through commercial bank balance sheets, it need not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress, it ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use: Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Thu, 31 Mar 2022 17:35:27 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart alteration in commercial bank liabilities, such as in short-term deposits issued to finance reserves and in off-balance-sheet encumbrances pledged against reserves, which are also claims on liquidity. In ordinary times, when these claims are not called on, central bank balance sheet expansion will typically enhance the net availability of liquidity to the system. However, in times of stress when these offsetting claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly more. Furthermore, liquid commercial banks, desiring to maintain unimpeachable balance sheets, may provide only limited re-intermediation of liquidity and contribute significantly to liquidity shortages. Commercial banks do not fully internalize prospective stress ex ante or take sufficient steps ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Thu, 31 Mar 2022 17:35:26 -0500
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart alteration in commercial bank liabilities, such as in short-term deposits issued to finance reserves and in off-balance-sheet encumbrances pledged against reserves, which are also claims on liquidity. In ordinary times, when these claims are not called on, central bank balance sheet expansion will typically enhance the net availability of liquidity to the system. However, in times of stress when these offsetting claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly more. Furthermore, liquid commercial banks, desiring to maintain unimpeachable balance sheets, may provide only limited re-intermediation of liquidity and contribute significantly to liquidity shortages. Commercial banks do not fully internalize prospective stress ex ante or take sufficient steps ...

REVISION: What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders
Date Posted:Tue, 29 Mar 2022 18:02:13 -0500
Using natural language processing, we identify and categorize the corporate goals in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States, from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated during this period from an average of two in 1955 to almost 10 in 2020. We find a variety of factors are associated with a corporation stating a specific goal including advertising a firm’s strengths, promising improved performance, signaling a commitment to specific constituencies, building societal legitimacy, and conforming to the behavior of other corporations. In spite of the proliferation of corporate goals, executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on shareholder value, as measured by stock prices and financial performance. Yet, we do observe the rise in bonus payments made contingent on social and environmental objectives, especially among the signatories of the 2019 Business Roundtable statement on corporate purpose.

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders
Date Posted:Tue, 29 Mar 2022 12:19:40 -0500
Using natural language processing, we identify and categorize the corporate goals in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States, from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated during this period from an average of two in 1955 to almost 10 in 2020. We find a variety of factors are associated with a corporation stating a specific goal including advertising a firm?s strengths, promising improved performance, signaling a commitment to specific constituencies, building societal legitimacy, and conforming to the behavior of other corporations. In spite of the proliferation of corporate goals, executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on shareholder value, as measured by stock prices and financial performance. Yet, we do observe the rise in bonus payments made contingent on social and environmental objectives, especially among the signatories of the 2019 Business Roundtable statement on corporate purpose.

REVISION: What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders
Date Posted:Tue, 29 Mar 2022 03:26:00 -0500
Using natural language processing, we identify and categorize the corporate goals in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States, from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated during this period from an average of two in 1955 to almost 10 in 2020. We find a variety of factors are associated with a corporation stating a specific goal including advertising a firm’s strengths, promising improved performance, signaling a commitment to specific constituencies, building societal legitimacy, and conforming to the behavior of other corporations. In spite of the proliferation of corporate goals, executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on shareholder value, as measured by stock prices and financial performance. Yet, we do observe the rise in bonus payments made contingent on social and environmental objectives, especially among the signatories of the 2019 Business Roundtable statement on corporate purpose.

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Feb 2022 06:43:47 -0600
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart alteration in commercial bank liabilities, such as in short-term deposits issued to finance reserves and in off-balance-sheet encumbrances pledged against reserves, which are also claims on liquidity. In ordinary times, when these claims are not called on, central bank balance sheet expansion will typically enhance the net availability of liquidity to the system. However, in times of stress when these offsetting claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly more. Furthermore, liquid commercial banks, desiring to maintain unimpeachable balance sheets, may provide only limited re-intermediation of liquidity and contribute significantly to liquidity shortages. Commercial banks do not fully internalize prospective stress ex ante or take sufficient steps ...

REVISION: Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use: Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Feb 2022 06:42:32 -0600
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart alteration in commercial bank liabilities, such as in short-term deposits issued to finance reserves and in off-balance-sheet encumbrances pledged against reserves, which are also claims on liquidity. In ordinary times, when these claims are not called on, central bank balance sheet expansion will typically enhance the net availability of liquidity to the system. However, in times of stress when these offsetting claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly more. Furthermore, liquid commercial banks, desiring to maintain unimpeachable balance sheets, may provide only limited re-intermediation of liquidity and contribute significantly to liquidity shortages. Commercial banks do not fully internalize prospective stress ex ante or take sufficient steps ...

REVISION: The Secured Credit Premium and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Mon, 07 Feb 2022 06:28:09 -0600
Credit spreads for secured debt are lower than for unsecured debt, especially when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet investment grade firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt at all times. In contrast, we find that for firms that are rated below-investment grade, the likelihood of secured debt issuance increases as firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This differential pattern of issue behavior is consistent with highly rated firms seeing unencumbered collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Fri, 04 Feb 2022 17:58:53 -0600
Central bank balance sheet expansion is financed by commercial banks. It involves not just a substitution of liquid central bank reserves for other assets held by commercial banks, but also a counterpart increase in commercial bank liabilities, such as short-term deposits issued to finance reserves. Banks typically also write a variety of other claims on reserve holdings. Normally, central bank balance sheet expansion will enhance the net future availability of liquidity to the system. However, in episodes of stress when a large fraction of claims on liquidity are exercised, the demand for liquidity can be significantly greater than the availability of reserves. Furthermore, at such times some liquid commercial banks may hoard reserves to bolster their own prospects, contributing significantly to liquidity shortages. Therefore, because central bank balance sheet expansion operates through commercial bank balance sheets, it need not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress, it may even exacerbate them. This may also attenuate any positive effects of central bank balance sheet expansion on economic activity.

Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets
Date Posted:Wed, 26 Jan 2022 19:54:37 -0600
When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expands its balance sheet via quantitative easing (QE), we show commercial banks finance their reserve holdings with demandable deposits, especially uninsured ones, and also issue lines of credit to corporations. These bank-issued claims on liquidity did not shrink when the Fed halted its balance-sheet expansion in 2014 and eventually actively reversed it during quantitative tightening (QT) starting in 2017. Consequently, the financial sector, especially smaller and less-well-capitalized banks that increased their liquidity risk exposure more, became vulnerable to potential liquidity shocks. This in turn has necessitated further liquidity provision by the Fed, as witnessed in September 2019 (repo rate spike), March 2020 (dash for cash due to COVID-19 outbreak), and March 2023 (uninsured depositor runs on banks). The evidence suggests that the expansion and shrinkage of central bank balance sheets leads to liquidity dependence in the financial system, suggesting potential tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial stability.

Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use ? Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:53:48 -0600
Central bank balance sheet expansion is run through commercial banks. While liquid central bank reserves held on commercial bank balance sheets increase, demandable uninsured deposits issued to finance the reserves also increase. A subsequent shrinkage in the central bank balance sheet may entail a shrinkage in bank-held reserves without a commensurate reduction in deposit claims. Furthermore, during episodes of liquidity stress, when many claims on liquidity are called, surplus banks may hoard reserves. As a result of such bank behavior, central bank balance sheet expansion may create less systemic liquidity than typically thought, and in fact, the demand for liquidity can occasionally exceed available reserves, exacerbating liquidity stress.

Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use - Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:46:53 -0600
When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expands its balance sheet via quantitative easing (QE), we show commercial banks finance their reserve holdings with demandable deposits, especially uninsured ones, and also issue lines of credit to corporations. These bank-issued claims on liquidity did not shrink when the Fed halted its balance-sheet expansion in 2014 and eventually actively reversed it during quantitative tightening (QT) starting in 2017. Consequently, the financial sector, especially smaller and less-well-capitalized banks that increased their liquidity risk exposure more, became vulnerable to potential liquidity shocks. This in turn has necessitated further liquidity provision by the Fed, as witnessed in September 2019 (repo rate spike), March 2020 (dash for cash due to COVID-19 outbreak), and March 2023 (uninsured depositor runs on banks). The evidence suggests that the expansion and shrinkage of central bank balance sheets leads to liquidity dependence in the financial system, suggesting potential tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial stability.

REVISION: The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Wed, 15 Dec 2021 10:05:50 -0600
The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security up front. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently – when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Thu, 12 Aug 2021 10:54:45 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Wed, 11 Aug 2021 10:50:56 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Wed, 19 May 2021 03:33:42 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending, soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

REVISION: The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Fri, 30 Apr 2021 10:17:59 -0500
The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security up front. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently – when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

REVISION: The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Thu, 29 Apr 2021 11:00:27 -0500
The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security up front. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently – when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

REVISION: Kill Zone
Date Posted:Tue, 16 Feb 2021 12:07:23 -0600
We study why acquisitions of entrant firms by an incumbent can deter innovation and entry in the digital platform industry, where there are strong network externalities and some customers face switching costs. A high probability of an acquisition induces some potential early adopters to wait for the entrant's product to be integrated into the incumbent's product instead of switching to the entrant. Because of this, the incumbent is able to acquire the entrant for a lower price. Even if the incumbent platform does not undertake any traditional anti-competitive action, the reduction in prospective payoffs to entrants creates a “kill zone” in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where entry is hard to finance. The drop-off in venture capital investment in startups in sectors where Facebook and Google make major acquisitions suggests this is more than just a theoretical possibility.

Liquidity, Pledgeability, and the Nature of Lending
Date Posted:Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:33:27 -0600
We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm?s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

Liquidity, Pledgeability, and the Nature of Lending
Date Posted:Mon, 25 Jan 2021 19:07:25 -0600
We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm?s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

New: Liquidity, Pledgeability, and the Nature of Lending
Date Posted:Mon, 25 Jan 2021 09:10:17 -0600
We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm’s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

REVISION: Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Sat, 05 Dec 2020 12:10:57 -0600
A simple proxy for a bank’s credit risk – the average physical distance of small corporate borrowers from their bank’s branches – suggests risky lending before the global financial crisis was pro-cyclical and especially so in banks operating in counties where banking was competitive. Surprisingly, such lending took off as the Fed raised interest rates between 2004 and 2007. We argue that bank responses to the rate hikes led to a shift of bank deposits into counties where banking was competitive. Short-horizon bank management recycled these new deposits into loans to more distant counties where banking was not competitive. Unfortunately, given the difficulty of making distant small business loans, loan quality deteriorated. We discuss the conditions under which a normalization of interest rates can lead to a deterioration in loan quality.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Thu, 03 Dec 2020 03:25:52 -0600
We show that after accounting for selection, credit spreads for secured debt issuances are lower than for unsecured debt issuances, especially when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt when other forms of financing are available, as we demonstrate with an analysis of security issuance over time and in particular around the COVID-19 pandemic shock in the United States in early 2020. We find that for firms that are rated non-investment grade and that have few alternative sources of financing in difficult times, the likelihood of secured debt issuance is positively correlated with the spread between traded unsecured and secured bonds. It is not correlated for firms that are investment grade. This pattern of issue behavior is consistent with theories that see collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Thu, 03 Dec 2020 02:55:27 -0600
We show that after accounting for selection, credit spreads for secured debt issuances are lower than for unsecured debt issuances, especially when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt when other forms of financing are available, as we demonstrate with an analysis of security issuance over time and in particular around the COVID-19 pandemic shock in the United States in early 2020. We find that for firms that are rated non-investment grade and that have few alternative sources of financing in difficult times, the likelihood of secured debt issuance is positively correlated with the spread between traded unsecured and secured bonds. It is not correlated for firms that are investment grade. This pattern of issue behavior is consistent with theories that see collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Wed, 02 Dec 2020 03:43:20 -0600
We show that after accounting for selection, credit spreads for secured debt issuances are lower than for unsecured debt issuances, especially when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt when other forms of financing are available, as we demonstrate with an analysis of security issuance over time and in particular around the COVID-19 pandemic shock in the United States in early 2020. We find that for firms that are rated non-investment grade and that have few alternative sources of financing in difficult times, the likelihood of secured debt issuance is positively correlated with the spread between traded unsecured and secured bonds. It is not correlated for firms that are investment grade. This pattern of issue behavior is consistent with theories that see collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Mon, 29 Jun 2020 15:02:22 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its odious government's ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country's growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government is myopic and wants to maximize short-term, socially unproductive, spending. Interestingly, access to external borrowing can extend the government's effective horizon; the government's ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government's effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a "growth trap" where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to debt. We characterize circumstances in which odious government leads to odious debt and those in which it does not, and discuss policies that might ameliorate the welfare of the citizenry.

When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Tue, 26 May 2020 17:53:07 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its odious government?s ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country?s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government is myopic and wants to maximize short-term, socially unproductive, spending. Interestingly, access to external borrowing can extend the government?s effective horizon; the government?s ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government?s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a ?growth trap? where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to debt. We characterize circumstances in which odious government leads to odious debt and those in which it does not, and discuss policies that might ameliorate the welfare of the citizenry.

REVISION: When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Thu, 21 May 2020 03:59:04 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its government’s ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country’s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government’s objective is to maximize short-term, typically wasteful, expenditures. Sovereign debt can extend the government’s effective horizon; the government’s ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to adopt policies that result in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, access to borrowing does not always improve government behavior. In a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a “growth trap” where household steady-state consumption is lower than if ...

REVISION: When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Thu, 21 May 2020 03:58:23 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its government’s ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country’s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government’s objective is to maximize short-term, typically wasteful, expenditures. Sovereign debt can extend the government’s effective horizon; the government’s ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to adopt policies that result in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, access to borrowing does not always improve government behavior. In a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a “growth trap” where household steady-state consumption is lower than if ...

Kill Zone
Date Posted:Mon, 18 May 2020 17:07:17 -0500
Venture capitalists suggest that incumbent internet platforms create a kill zone around themselves, where any competing entrant is acquired quickly. Consequently, financing new startups becomes unprofitable. We construct a simple model that rationalizes the existence of a kill zone. The price at which an acquisition is done depends on the number of customers the entrant platform can attract if it remains independent, which in turn depends on the number of apps that have adapted to the platform. The prospect of a quick acquisition by the incumbent platform, however, reduces the app designers? benefits from adaptation, making it harder for a technological superior entrant to acquire customers. This reduces the stand-alone price of the new entrant, decreasing the price at which they will be acquired, and thus reducing the incentives of VCs to finance their entry. We discuss the policy implications of this model.

REVISION: The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Tue, 12 May 2020 03:42:03 -0500
We document a steady decline in the share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) in the United States over the twentieth century, with some pickup in this century. Superimposed on this secular trend, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical. The secular decline in the issuance of collateralized debt seems to result from creditors acquiring greater confidence over time that the priority of their debt claims will be respected even if they do not obtain security up front. Borrowers also do not seem to want to lose financial and operational flexibility by giving security up front. Instead, security is given on a contingent basis – when a firm approaches distress. Similar arguments explain why debt is more likely to be secured in the down phase of a cycle than in the up phase, thus accounting for the cyclicality of secured debt share.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads
Date Posted:Tue, 12 May 2020 03:41:38 -0500
Lenders are unwilling to accept lower credit spreads for secured debt relative to unsecured debt when a firm is healthy. However, they accept significantly lower credit spreads for secured debt when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This contingent valuation of collateral or security, coupled with the borrower perceiving a loss of operational and financial flexibility when issuing secured debt, may explain why firms issue secured debt on a contingent basis; they issue more when their credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, and average credit spreads widen.

Kill Zone
Date Posted:Fri, 08 May 2020 12:16:44 -0500
We study why acquisitions of entrant firms by an incumbent can deter innovation and entry in the digital platform industry, where there are strong network externalities and some customers face switching costs. A high probability of an acquisition induces some potential early adopters to wait for the entrant's product to be integrated into the incumbent's product instead of switching to the entrant. Because of this, the incumbent is able to acquire the entrant for a lower price. Even if the incumbent platform does not undertake any traditional anti-competitive action, the reduction in prospective payoffs to entrants creates a "kill zone" in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where entry is hard to finance. The drop-off in venture capital investment in startups in sectors where Facebook and Google make major acquisitions suggests this is more than just a theoretical possibility.

REVISION: Kill Zone
Date Posted:Tue, 28 Apr 2020 03:35:45 -0500
We study why high-priced acquisitions of entrants by an incumbent do not necessarily stimulate more innovation and entry in an industry (like that of digital platforms) where customers face switching costs and enjoy network externalities. The prospect of an acquisition by the incumbent platform undermines early adoption by customers, reducing prospective payoffs to new entrants. This creates a “kill zone” in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where new ventures are not worth funding. Evidence from changes in investment in startups by venture capitalists after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google suggests this is more than a mere theoretical possibility.

Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth when Government is Myopic and Self-interested
Date Posted:Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:01:29 -0500
We examine how a sovereign?s ability to borrow abroad affects the country?s growth
and steady state consumption, assuming that the government is both myopic and
self-interested. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country?s access
to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government?s
effective horizon as the government?s ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors
they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in incentivizing private production
and savings despite its self-interest. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the
government?s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ?growth
boost", with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow.
However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive
policies to enhance its debt capacity and spending. This could lead to a ?growth
trap? where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government
had no access to external borrowing. We discuss the effectiveness of alternative
debt policies, including declaring the sovereign?s debt ?odious?, debt relief, and
debt ceilings.

REVISION: When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Fri, 10 Apr 2020 11:01:32 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its government’s ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country’s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government’s objective is to maximize short-term, typically wasteful, expenditures. Sovereign debt can extend the government’s effective horizon; the government’s ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to adopt policies that result in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, access to borrowing does not always improve government behavior. In a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a “growth trap” where household steady-state consumption is lower than if ...

Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth when Government is Myopic and Self-interested
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Mar 2020 21:15:09 -0500
We examine how a sovereign?s ability to borrow abroad affects the country?s growth and steady state consumption, assuming that the government is both myopic and self-interested. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country?s access to external borrowing. In turn, access to borrowing can extend the government?s effective horizon as the government?s ability to borrow hinges on it convincing creditors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in incentivizing private production and savings despite its self-interest. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government?s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a ?growth boost", with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in more repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity and spending. This could lead to a ?growth trap? where household steady-state consumption is lower than if the government had no access to external borrowing. We discuss the effectiveness of alternative debt policies, including declaring the sovereign?s debt ?odious?, debt relief, and debt ceilings.

Kill Zone
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Mar 2020 20:55:10 -0500
We study why acquisitions of entrant firms by an incumbent can deter innovation and entry in the digital platform industry, where there are strong network externalities and some customers face switching costs. A high probability of an acquisition induces some potential early adopters to wait for the entrant's product to be integrated into the incumbent's product instead of switching to the entrant. Because of this, the incumbent is able to acquire the entrant for a lower price. Even if the incumbent platform does not undertake any traditional anti-competitive action, the reduction in prospective payoffs to entrants creates a ?kill zone? in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where entry is hard to finance. The drop-off in venture capital investment in startups in sectors where Facebook and Google make major acquisitions suggests this is more than just a theoretical possibility.

REVISION: When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Mar 2020 12:15:09 -0500
How is a developing country affected by its government’s ability to borrow in international markets? We examine the dynamics of a country’s growth, consumption, and sovereign debt, assuming that the government’s objective is to maximize short-term, typically wasteful, expenditures. Sovereign debt can extend the government’s effective horizon; the government’s ability to borrow hinges on its convincing investors they will be repaid, which gives it a stake in the future. The lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to adopt policies that result in higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow. However, access to borrowing does not always improve government behavior. In a developing country that saves little, the government may engage in repressive policies to enhance its debt capacity, which only ensures that successor governments repress as well. This leads to a “growth trap” where household steady-state consumption is lower than if ...

REVISION: Kill Zone
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:55:10 -0500
We study why high-priced acquisitions of entrants by an incumbent do not necessarily stimulate more innovation and entry in an industry (like that of digital platforms) where customers face switching costs and enjoy network externalities. The prospect of an acquisition by the incumbent platform undermines early adoption by customers, reducing prospective payoffs to new entrants. This creates a “kill zone” in the start-up space, as described by venture capitalists, where new ventures are not worth funding. Evidence from changes in investment in startups by venture capitalists after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google suggests this is more than a mere theoretical possibility.

Secured Credit Spreads and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Wed, 04 Mar 2020 15:34:08 -0600
We show that after accounting for selection, credit spreads for secured debt issuances are lower than for unsecured debt issuances, especially when a firm?s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt when other forms of financing are available, as we demonstrate with an analysis of security issuance over time and in particular around the COVID-19 pandemic shock in the United States in early 2020. We find that for firms that are rated non-investment grade and that have few alternative sources of financing in difficult times, the likelihood of secured debt issuance is positively correlated with the spread between traded unsecured and secured bonds. It is not correlated for firms that are investment grade. This pattern of issue behavior is consistent with theories that see collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads
Date Posted:Wed, 04 Mar 2020 05:34:46 -0600
Lenders are unwilling to accept lower credit spreads for secured debt relative to unsecured debt when a firm is healthy. However, they accept significantly lower credit spreads for secured debt when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This contingent valuation of collateral or security, coupled with the borrower perceiving a loss of operational and financial flexibility when issuing secured debt, may explain why firms issue secured debt on a contingent basis; they issue more when their credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, and average credit spreads widen.

The Secured Credit Premium and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Mon, 02 Mar 2020 20:37:30 -0600
Credit spreads for secured debt are lower than for unsecured debt, especially when a firm?s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet investment grade firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt at all times. In contrast, we find that for firms that are rated below-investment grade, the likelihood of secured debt issuance increases as firm?s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This differential pattern of issue behavior is consistent with highly rated firms seeing unencumbered collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

The Secured Credit Premium and the Issuance of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Mon, 02 Mar 2020 15:25:44 -0600
Credit spreads for secured debt are lower than for unsecured debt, especially when a firm?s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet investment grade firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt at all times. In contrast, we find that for firms that are rated below-investment grade, the likelihood of secured debt issuance increases as firm?s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This differential pattern of issue behavior is consistent with highly rated firms seeing unencumbered collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

REVISION: Secured Credit Spreads
Date Posted:Mon, 02 Mar 2020 10:38:03 -0600
Lenders are unwilling to accept lower credit spreads for secured debt relative to unsecured debt when a firm is healthy. However, they accept significantly lower credit spreads for secured debt when a firm’s credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This contingent valuation of collateral or security, coupled with the borrower perceiving a loss of operational and financial flexibility when issuing secured debt, may explain why firms issue secured debt on a contingent basis; they issue more when their credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, and average credit spreads widen.

The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Mon, 13 Jan 2020 18:55:09 -0600
The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security up front. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently ? when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Fri, 10 Jan 2020 20:24:16 -0600
The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security up front. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently ? when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

REVISION: The Decline of Secured Debt
Date Posted:Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:24:39 -0600
We document a steady decline in the share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total debt) in the United States over the twentieth century, with some pickup in this century. Superimposed on this secular trend, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical. The secular decline in secured debt issuance seems to result from creditors acquiring greater confidence over time that the priority of their debt claims will be respected even if they do not obtain security up front. Borrowers also do not seem to want to lose financial and operational flexibility by giving security up front. Instead, security is given on a contingent basis – when a firm approaches distress. Similar arguments explain why debt is more likely to be secured in the down phase of a cycle than in the up phase, thus accounting for the cyclicality of secured debt share.

REVISION: Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Wed, 04 Sep 2019 03:45:13 -0500
We examine how competition amongst lenders exacerbates risk taking during a boom using a simple proxy for the risk of a bank’s loan portfolio—the average physical distance of borrowers from banks’ branches. The evolution of lending distances is cyclical, lengthening considerably during an economic upturn and shortening again during the ensuing downturn. More distant small business loans are indeed riskier for the bank, and greater lending distance is reflective of more generalized bank risk taking. As competition in banks’ local lending markets increases, their local lending becomes riskier, and their propensity to make (risky) loans at greater distance increases.

Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Mon, 10 Jun 2019 14:26:37 -0500
We examine the degree to which competition amongst lenders interacts with the cyclicality in lending standards using a simple measure, the average physical distance of borrowers from banks? branches. We propose that this novel measure captures the extent to which lenders are willing to stretch their lending portfolio. Consistent with this idea, we find a significant cyclical component in the evolution of lending distances. Distances widen considerably when credit conditions are lax and shorten considerably when credit conditions become tighter. Next, we show that a sharp departure from the trend in distance between banks and borrowers is indicative of increased risk taking. Finally, we provide evidence that as competition in banks? local markets increases, their willingness to make loans at greater distance increases. Since average lending distance is easily measurable, it is potentially a useful measure for bank supervisors.

New: Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Mon, 10 Jun 2019 05:27:50 -0500
We examine the degree to which competition amongst lenders interacts with the cyclicality in lending standards using a simple measure, the average physical distance of borrowers from banks’ branches. We propose that this novel measure captures the extent to which lenders are willing to stretch their lending portfolio. Consistent with this idea, we find a significant cyclical component in the evolution of lending distances. Distances widen considerably when credit conditions are lax and shorten considerably when credit conditions become tighter. Next, we show that a sharp departure from the trend in distance between banks and borrowers is indicative of increased risk taking. Finally, we provide evidence that as competition in banks’ local markets increases, their willingness to make loans at greater distance increases. Since average lending distance is easily measurable, it is potentially a useful measure for bank supervisors.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Organizational Culture and the Adoption of Credit Scoring Technology in Indian Banking
Date Posted:Fri, 10 May 2019 05:11:20 -0500
Credit scoring was introduced in India in 2007. We study the pace of its adoption by new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned or public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs adopt scoring quickly for all borrowers. PSBs adopt scoring quickly for new borrowers but not for existing borrowers. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates and counterfactuals using scores available to but not used by PSBs indicate that universal adoption would reduce loan delinquencies significantly. Evidence from old private banks suggests that neither bank size nor government ownership fully explains adoption patterns. Organizational culture, possibly from formative experiences in sheltered markets, explains the patterns of technology adoption.

The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:52:42 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Organizational Culture and the Adoption of Credit Scoring Technology in Indian Banking
Date Posted:Tue, 02 Apr 2019 05:54:10 -0500
Credit scoring was introduced in India in 2007. We study the pace of its adoption by new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned or public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs adopt scoring quickly for all borrowers. PSBs adopt scoring quickly for new borrowers but not for existing borrowers. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates and counterfactuals using scores available to but not used by PSBs indicate that universal adoption would reduce loan delinquencies significantly. Evidence from old private banks suggests that neither bank size nor government ownership fully explains adoption patterns. Organizational culture, possibly from formative experiences in sheltered markets, explains the patterns of technology adoption.

The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Mon, 01 Apr 2019 16:09:31 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

The Relationship Dilemma: Why Do Banks Differ in the Pace at Which They Adopt New Technology?
Date Posted:Thu, 28 Mar 2019 16:34:58 -0500
India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there, new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending soon after the technology is introduced. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption is the stickiness of past bank structures and associated managerial practices. Past practices hold back better practices today.

REVISION: The Relationship Dilemma: Organizational Culture and the Adoption of Credit Scoring Technology in Indian Banking
Date Posted:Thu, 28 Mar 2019 07:36:18 -0500
Credit scoring was introduced in India in 2007. We study the pace of its adoption by new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned or public sector banks (PSBs). NPBs adopt scoring quickly for all borrowers. PSBs adopt scoring quickly for new borrowers but not for existing borrowers. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates and counterfactuals using scores available to but not used by PSBs indicate that universal adoption would reduce loan delinquencies significantly. Evidence from old private banks suggests that neither bank size nor government ownership fully explains adoption patterns. Organizational culture, possibly from formative experiences in sheltered markets, explains the patterns of technology adoption.

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Fri, 30 Nov 2018 05:27:40 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control. Our paper can explain why partnerships work well even if control rights are concentrated at the top, why a public firm’s shares have value even when shareholders have limited power, and when structuring an entity as a publicly-held firm is better than structuring it as a partnership.

Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Tue, 13 Nov 2018 18:44:23 -0600
A simple proxy for a bank?s credit risk ? the average physical distance of small corporate borrowers from their bank?s branches ? suggests risky lending before the global financial crisis was pro-cyclical and especially so in banks operating in counties where banking was competitive. Surprisingly, such lending took off as the Fed raised interest rates between 2004 and 2007. We argue that bank responses to the rate hikes led to a shift of bank deposits into counties where banking was competitive. Short-horizon bank management recycled these new deposits into loans to more distant counties where banking was not competitive. Unfortunately, given the difficulty of making distant small business loans, loan quality deteriorated. We discuss the conditions under which a normalization of interest rates can lead to a deterioration in loan quality.

REVISION: Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Tue, 13 Nov 2018 08:44:23 -0600
We examine the degree to which competition amongst lenders interacts with the cyclicality in lending standards using a simple measure, the average physical distance of borrowers from banks’ branches. We propose that this novel measure captures the extent to which lenders are willing to stretch their lending portfolio. Consistent with this idea, we find a significant cyclical component in the evolution of lending distances. Distances widen considerably when credit conditions are lax and shorten considerably when credit conditions become tighter. Next, we show that a sharp departure from the trend in distance between banks and borrowers is indicative of increased risk taking. Finally, we provide evidence that as competition in banks’ local markets increases, their willingness to make loans at greater distance increases. Since average lending distance is easily measurable, it is potentially a useful measure for bank supervisors.

Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
Date Posted:Mon, 29 Oct 2018 13:07:21 -0500
The average distance of U.S. banks from their small corporate borrowers increased before the global financial crisis, especially for banks in competitive counties. Small distant loans are harder to make, so loan quality deteriorated. Surprisingly, such lending intensified as the Fed raised interest rates from 2004. Why? We show banks? responses to higher rates led to bank deposits shifting into competitive counties. Short-horizon bank management recycled these inflows into risky loans to distant uncompetitive counties. Thus, rate hikes, competition, and managerial short-termism explain why inflows ?burned a hole? in banks? pockets and, more generally, increased risky lending.

Financial Fire Sales: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Wed, 31 May 2017 15:21:55 -0500
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary's assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. These financial fire sales can both cause, and exacerbate, real fire sales, the focus of previous studies. This paper investigates the relevance of financial fire sales using new datasets covering bank failures during the farm depression in the United States just before the Great Depression, as well as bank failures during the Great Depression. Using differences in regulation as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent distress in nearby banks. All this indicates a rationale for why bank failures are contagious.

New: Financial Fire Sales: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Wed, 31 May 2017 06:21:55 -0500
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary's assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. These financial fire sales can both cause, and exacerbate, real fire sales, the focus of previous studies. This paper investigates the relevance of financial fire sales using new datasets covering bank failures during the farm depression in the United States just before the Great Depression, as well as bank failures during the Great Depression. Using differences in regulation as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent distress in nearby banks. All this ...

Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Jan 2017 09:08:21 -0600
Why do firms choose high debt when they anticipate high valuations, and underperform subsequently? We propose a theory of financing cycles where the importance of creditors? control rights over cash flows (?pledgeability?) varies with industry liquidity. The market allows firms take on more debt when they anticipate higher future liquidity. However, both high anticipated liquidity and the resulting high debt limit their incentives to enhance pledgeability. This has prolonged adverse effects in a downturn. Because these effects are hard to contract upon, higher anticipated liquidity can also reduce a firm?s current access to finance.

Trade Credit Contracts
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Apr 2016 14:29:04 -0500
The authors employ a novel dataset on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics of the parties that contract together; the key contractual terms, such as the discount for early payment; and the days by when payment is due. Whereas prior work has typically used information on only one side of the buyer-seller transaction, this paper utilizes information on both. The authors find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from smaller suppliers, with the latter extending credit to the former perhaps as a way of certifying product quality. Discounts for early payment seem to be offered to riskier buyers to limit the potential nonpayment risk when credit is extended for non-financial reasons.

Trade Credit Contracts
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Apr 2016 14:28:48 -0500
This paper provides new evidence on the unique role of trade credit and contracting terms as a way for both sellers and buyers to mange business risk. The authors use a novel and unique dataset on almost 30,000 supplier contracts for 56 large buyers and more than 24,000 suppliers in Europe and North America. The sample of buyers and suppliers includes firms of varying size, investment grade, and sectors. The paper finds evidence in support of four important, and not mutually exclusive, reasons for trade credit: 1) as a method of financing; 2) as a means of price discrimination; 3) as a bond assuring buyers of product quality; and 4) as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk. In particular, the analysis finds that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade suppliers. In comparison, early payment discounts seem to be used as a risk management tool to limit the potential nonpayment risk of trade credit. Early payment discounts are generally offered to smaller, non-investment grade buyers. The results suggest that contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and buyer characteristics.

Crises and the Development of Economic Institutions: Some Microeconomic Evidence
Date Posted:Mon, 08 Feb 2016 16:44:47 -0600
This paper studies the long run effects of financial crises using new bank and town level data from around the Great Depression. We find evidence that banking markets became much more concentrated in areas that experienced a greater initial collapse in the local banking system. There is also evidence that financial regulation after the Great Depression, and in particular limits on bank branching, may have helped to render the effects of the initial collapse persistent. All of this suggests a reason why post-crisis financial regulation, while potentially reducing financial instability, might also have longer run real consequences.

New: Crises and the Development of Economic Institutions: Some Microeconomic Evidence
Date Posted:Mon, 08 Feb 2016 06:44:47 -0600
This paper studies the long run effects of financial crises using new bank and town level data from around the Great Depression. We find evidence that banking markets became much more concentrated in areas that experienced a greater initial collapse in the local banking system. There is also evidence that financial regulation after the Great Depression, and in particular limits on bank branching, may have helped to render the effects of the initial collapse persistent. All of this suggests a reason why post-crisis financial regulation, while potentially reducing financial instability, might also have longer run real consequences.

REVISION: Local Financial Capacity and Asset Values: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Thu, 29 Jan 2015 03:04:16 -0600
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary's assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. These financial fire sales can both cause, and exacerbate, real fire sales, the focus of previous studies. This paper investigates the relevance of financial fire sales using new datasets covering bank failures during the farm depression in the United States just before the Great Depression, as well as bank failures during the Great Depression. Using differences in regulation as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent distress in nearby banks. All this ...

REVISION: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Thu, 25 Dec 2014 01:35:54 -0600
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the strength of various interests in the district for expanded banking competition. We find congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated (suggesting a landed elite), and where the cost of bank credit was high and its availability limited (suggesting limited banking competition and high potential rents), were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The evidence suggests that while the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financial system far into the future, they ...

REVISION: The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 1920s
Date Posted:Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:39:55 -0600
Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? What channels could it work through? What are the long run consequences? In this paper we address these questions by examining the farm land price boom (and bust) in the United States that preceded the Great Depression. We find that credit availability likely had a direct effect on inflating land prices. Credit availability may have also amplified the relationship between the perceived improvement in fundamentals and land prices. When the perceived fundamentals soured, however, areas with higher ex ante credit availability suffered a greater fall in land prices, and experienced higher bank failure rates. Land prices stayed low for a number of decades after the bust in areas that had higher credit availability, suggesting that the effects of booms and busts induced by credit availability might be persistent. We draw lessons for regulatory policy.

Local Financial Capacity and Asset Values: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Thu, 09 Oct 2014 23:43:05 -0500
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary's assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. These financial fire sales can both cause, and exacerbate, real fire sales, the focus of previous studies. This paper investigates the relevance of financial fire sales using new datasets covering bank failures during the farm depression in the United States just before the Great Depression, as well as bank failures during the Great Depression. Using differences in regulation as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent distress in nearby banks. All this indicates a rationale for why bank failures are contagious.

REVISION: Financial Fire Sales: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:43:05 -0500
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary's assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. These financial fire sales can both cause, and exacerbate, real fire sales, the focus of previous studies. This paper investigates the relevance of financial fire sales using new datasets covering bank failures during the farm depression in the United States just before the Great Depression, as well as bank failures during the Great Depression. Using differences in regulation as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent distress in nearby banks. All this ...

REVISION: The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 1920s
Date Posted:Thu, 02 Oct 2014 08:03:01 -0500
Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? What channels could it work through? What are the long run consequences? In this paper we address these questions by examining the farm land price boom (and bust) in the United States that preceded the Great Depression. We find that credit availability likely had a direct effect on inflating land prices. Credit availability may have also amplified the relationship between the perceived improvement in fundamentals and land prices. When the perceived fundamentals soured, however, areas with higher ex ante credit availability suffered a greater fall in land prices, and experienced higher bank failure rates. Land prices stayed low for a number of decades after the bust in areas that had higher credit availability, suggesting that the effects of booms and busts induced by credit availability might be persistent. We draw lessons for regulatory policy.

Financing Capacity and Fire Sales: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Tue, 19 Nov 2013 09:06:20 -0600
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary?s assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. This paper investigates these predictions using a new dataset of bank failures during the farm depression just before the Great Depression. Using regulatory impediments to lending across state borders as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent financial sector distress among nearby banks. All this indicates a rationale for why bank failures are contagious.

New: Financing Capacity and Fire Sales: Evidence from Bank Failures
Date Posted:Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:06:21 -0600
Theory suggests the reduction in financing capacity after the failure of a financial intermediary can reduce the value of financial assets. Forced sales of the intermediary’s assets could consume liquidity, depressing the liquidation value of the assets of healthy intermediaries and causing contagious runs. This paper investigates these predictions using a new dataset of bank failures during the farm depression just before the Great Depression. Using regulatory impediments to lending across state borders as a means of identification, we find that the reduction in local financing capacity as a result of bank failures reduces the recovery rates on failed assets of nearby banks, depresses local land prices, renders land markets illiquid, and is associated with subsequent financial sector distress among nearby banks. All this indicates a rationale for why bank failures are contagious.

The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 1920s
Date Posted:Sun, 30 Dec 2012 11:06:18 -0600
Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? What channels could it work through? What are the long run consequences? In this paper we address these questions by examining the farm land price boom (and bust) in the United States that preceded the Great Depression. We find that credit availability likely had a direct effect on inflating land prices. Credit availability may have also amplified the relationship between the perceived improvement in fundamentals and land prices. When the perceived fundamentals soured, however, areas with higher ex ante credit availability suffered a greater fall in land prices, and experienced higher bank failure rates. Land prices stayed low for a number of decades after the bust in areas that had higher credit availability, suggesting that the effects of booms and busts induced by credit availability might be persistent. We draw lessons for regulatory policy.

Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Sun, 30 Dec 2012 11:03:46 -0600
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the strength of various interests in the district for expanded banking competition. We find congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated (suggesting a landed elite), and where the cost of bank credit was high and its availability limited (suggesting limited banking competition and high potential rents), were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The evidence suggests that while the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financial system far into the future, they themselves are likely to be shaped by well organized elites, even in countries with benign political institutions.

REVISION: The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 19
Date Posted:Sun, 30 Dec 2012 06:06:19 -0600
Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? What channels could it work through? What are the long run consequences? In this paper we address these questions by examining the farm land price boom (and bust) in the United States that preceded the Great Depression. We find that credit availability likely had a direct effect on inflating land prices. Credit availability may have also amplified the relationship between the perceived improvement in fundamentals and land prices. When ...

REVISION: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Sun, 30 Dec 2012 06:03:46 -0600
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the ...

REVISION: Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector
Date Posted:Mon, 30 Apr 2012 05:51:50 -0500
What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity bu tcan nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, thegreater the ...

The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 1920s
Date Posted:Sat, 28 Apr 2012 15:51:59 -0500
Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? Are there long run consequences? During the farm land price boom and bust before the Great Depression, we find that credit availability directly inflated land prices. Credit also amplified the relationship between positive fundamentals and land prices, leading to greater indebtedness. When fundamentals soured, areas with higher credit availability suffered a greater fall in land prices and had more bank failures. Land prices and credit availability also remained disproportionately low for decades in these areas, suggesting that leverage might render temporary credit induced booms and busts persistent. We draw lessons for regulatory policy.

REVISION: The Corporation in Finance
Date Posted:Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:52:07 -0500
The nature of the firm and its financing are closely interlinked. To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to transform her enterprise into one that is differentiated from the ordinary. To achieve the control that will allow her to execute this strategy, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will ...

REVISION: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:50:26 -0500
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the ...

The Corporation in Finance
Date Posted:Sat, 21 Jan 2012 12:19:34 -0600
The nature of the firm and its financing are closely interlinked. To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to transform her enterprise into one that is differentiated from the ordinary. To achieve the control that will allow her to execute this strategy, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain control rights that will allow them to be repaid. I argue that the availability of a vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations in a way that a debt market would not. This helps explain why the nature of firms and the extent of innovation differ so much in different financing environments.

REVISION: The Corporation in Finance
Date Posted:Fri, 13 Jan 2012 10:23:58 -0600
The nature of the firm and its financing are closely interlinked. To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to transform her enterprise into one that is differentiated from the ordinary. To achieve the control that will allow her to execute this strategy, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will ...

The Corporation in Finance
Date Posted:Fri, 13 Jan 2012 00:00:00 -0600
The nature of the firm and its financing are closely interlinked. To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to transform her enterprise into one that is differentiated from the ordinary. To achieve the control that will allow her to execute this strategy, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain rights over going-concern surplus. I argue that the availability of a vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations in a way that a debt market would not. This helps explain why the nature of firms and the extent of innovation differ so much in different financing environments.

Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises
Date Posted:Sun, 08 Jan 2012 12:39:07 -0600
We show in this paper that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or ex ante contractual links between banks, we argue bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a possible total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity problems and solvency problems interact and can cause each other, making it hard to determine the root cause of a crisis from observable factors. We propose a robust sequence of intervention.

REVISION: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the Mcfadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Tue, 26 Jul 2011 01:56:19 -0500
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the ...

REVISION: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the Mcfadden Act of 1927
Date Posted:Thu, 21 Jul 2011 04:58:16 -0500
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the ...

New: Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal
Date Posted:Wed, 27 Apr 2011 15:41:14 -0500
Rajan examines the problems of failed states, including the repeated return to power of former warlords, which he argues causes institutions to become weaker and people to get poorer. He notes that economic power through property holdings or human capital gives people the means to hold their leaders accountable. In the absence of such distributed power, dictators reign. Rajan argues that in failed states, economic growth leading to empowered citizenry is more likely if a neutral party presides.

New: Income Inequality and the Financial Crisis
Date Posted:Wed, 01 Dec 2010 08:12:49 -0600
At this year’s conference two panel discussions have been organized to address the most recent financial crisis and the associated policy implications. We recommend that you highlight your program schedule to ensure your participation in these engaging panel sessions.

New: Video: Frontiers of Research on Financial Institutions - Featured Panel
Date Posted:Mon, 18 Oct 2010 07:06:57 -0500
The current crisis has underlined the crucial importance of this area. Leading researchers in the field Maureen O'Hara, Kose John, Raghuram Rajan, and Anthony Saunders discuss how they approach research in this volatile area.

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Mon, 09 Aug 2010 18:34:13 -0500
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Mon, 09 Aug 2010 18:31:13 -0500
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by ...

New: Controlled Capital Account Liberalization: A Propasal
Date Posted:Thu, 29 Jul 2010 05:00:12 -0500
In this paper, we develop a proposal for a controlled approach to capital account liberalization for economies experiencing large capital inflows. The proposal essentially involves securitizing a portion of capital inflows through closed-end mutual funds that issue shares in domestic currency, use the proceeds to purchase foreign exchange from the central bank and then invest the proceeds abroad. This would eliminate the fiscal costs of sterilizing those inflows, give domestic investors ...

New: Trade Credit Contracts
Date Posted:Tue, 25 May 2010 15:28:54 -0500
This paper provides new evidence on the unique role of trade credit and contracting terms as a way for both sellers and buyers to mange business risk. We use a novel and unique dataset on almost 30,000 supplier contracts for 56 large buyers and over 24,000 suppliers in Europe and North America. Our sample of buyers and suppliers include firms of varying size, investment grade, and sectors. We find evidence in support of four important, and not mutually exclusive, reasons for trade credit: 1) ...

New: Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze
Date Posted:Wed, 05 May 2010 09:40:32 -0500
Is there any need to “clean” up a banking system in the midst of a crisis, by closing or recapitalizing weak banks and taking bad assets off bank balance sheets, or can one wait till the crisis is over? We argue that an “overhang” of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets soon can reduce the current price of illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them. Anticipating a potential future fire sale, cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding ...

New: Aid, Dutch Disease and Manufacturing Growth
Date Posted:Tue, 26 Jan 2010 15:15:18 -0600
We examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing, using a methodology that exploits the variation within countries and across manufacturing sectors, and corrects for possible reverse causality. We find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country’s competitiveness, as reflected in the lower relative growth rate of exportable industries. We provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows.

New: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Sat, 19 Dec 2009 22:01:30 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. Internal governance works best when both top management and subordinates are important in generating cash flow. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:34:46 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. Internal governance works best when both top management and subordinates are important in generating cash flow. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:32:45 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. Internal governance works best when both top management and subordinates are important in generating cash flow. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance ...

The Emergence of Strong Property Rights: Speculation from History
Date Posted:Thu, 08 Oct 2009 17:01:24 -0500
How did citizens acquire rights protecting their property from the depredations of the government? In this paper, we argue that one important factor strengthening respect for property is how it is distributed. When there is some specificity associated with property, and property is held by those who are most productive, the distribution of property becomes relatively easy to defend. By contrast, when property is owned by those who get rents simply by virtue of ownership, the distribution of ...

New: The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies
Date Posted:Sun, 27 Sep 2009 17:00:41 -0500
What caused the financial crisis that is sweeping across the world? What keeps asset prices and lending depressed? What can be done to remedy matters? While it is too early to arrive at definite answers to these questions, it is certainly time to offer informed conjectures, and these are the focus of this paper.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at

New: Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy
Date Posted:Tue, 18 Aug 2009 00:25:30 -0500
The cheapest way for banks to finance long term illiquid projects is typically to borrow short term from households. But when household needs for funds are high, interest rates will rise sharply, debtors will have to shut down illiquid projects, and in extremis, will face more damaging runs. Authorities may want to push down interest rates to maintain economic activity in the face of such illiquidity, but intervention may not always be feasible, and when feasible, could encourage banks to ...

New: Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th ...
Date Posted:Mon, 13 Jul 2009 02:49:51 -0500
Economists have argued that a high concentration of land holdings in a country can create powerful interest groups that retard the creation of economic institutions, and thus hold back economic development. Could these arguments apply beyond underdeveloped countries with backward political institutions? We find that in the early 20th century, the distribution of land in the United States is correlated with the extent of banking development. Correcting for state effects, counties with very ...

New: Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze
Date Posted:Sat, 13 Jun 2009 17:07:03 -0500
In early 2009, the supply of credit in industrial countries appeared to decline. Could this be because bank balance sheets were “clogged� with illiquid securities? If so, why did banks not attempt to sell them? We argue that an “overhang� of impaired banks that may be forced to sell soon can reduce the current price of illiquid securities sufficiently that banks have no interest in selling. This creates high expected returns to holding cash for potential buyers and an aversion to ...

New: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Tue, 07 Apr 2009 01:56:00 -0500
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for governance provided by external financiers and show that external governance, ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Wed, 18 Mar 2009 03:36:23 -0500
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for governance provided by external financiers and find situations where external ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Sun, 01 Mar 2009 19:00:18 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for governance provided by external financiers and show that external governance, ...

REVISION: The Internal Governance of Firms
Date Posted:Sat, 28 Feb 2009 06:25:34 -0600
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for governance provided by external financiers and show that external governance, ...

New: The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance
Date Posted:Thu, 19 Feb 2009 11:27:52 -0600
These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories: In a 40-plus year career notable for path-breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co-author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for ...

New: Landed Interests and Financial Underdevelopment in the United States
Date Posted:Thu, 02 Oct 2008 03:03:19 -0500
Landed elites in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century played a significant role in restricting the development of finance. States that had higher land concentration passed more restrictive banking legislation. At the county level, counties with very concentrated land holdings tended to have disproportionately fewer banks per capita. Banks were especially scarce both when landed elites' incentive to suppress finance, as well as their ability to exercise local ...

Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European Finance
Date Posted:Thu, 18 Sep 2008 02:51:19 -0500
In the last two decades the European financial markets have become more market oriented. We analyze the economic and political forces that have triggered these changes as well as their likely welfare implications. We also try to assess whether this trend will continue. Based on our analysis, we conjecture that even if Europe might benefit from a continuation of the trend, in the near future political support for it is likely to become much weaker. Furthermore, without serious reforms the ...

New: Landed Interests and Financial Underdevelopment in the United States
Date Posted:Thu, 11 Sep 2008 18:32:12 -0500
Landed elites in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century played a significant role in restricting the development of finance. States that had higher land concentration passed more restrictive banking legislation. At the county level, counties with very concentrated land holdings tended to have disproportionately fewer banks per capita. Banks were especially scarce both when landed elites' incentive to suppress finance, as well as their ability to exercise local ...

New: A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization
Date Posted:Tue, 10 Jun 2008 01:52:23 -0500
Cross-country regressions suggest little connection from foreign capital inflows to more rapid economic growth for developing countries and emerging markets. This suggests that the lack of domestic savings is not the primary constraint on growth in these economies, as implicitly assumed in the benchmark neoclassical framework. We explore emerging new theories on both the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization, and suggest how one might adopt a pragmatic approach to the process.

New: A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization
Date Posted:Thu, 22 May 2008 23:11:23 -0500
Cross-country regressions suggest little connection from foreign capital inflows to more rapid economic growth for developing countries and emerging markets. This suggests that the lack of domestic savings is not the primary constraint on growth in these economies, as implicitly assumed in the benchmark neoclassical framework. We explore emerging new theories on both the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization, and suggest how one might adopt a pragmatic approach to the process.

Power in a Theory of the Firm
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:49:12 -0500
What determines the boundaries of a firm? Is a firm defined solely by the ownership of physical assets as suggested by the property rights theory? This paper presents a theory of the firm based on the well-known idea that the firm improves over the market because it uses ex ante mechanisms to enhance specific investments. Maintaining the contractability assumptions of the property rights view, however, we identify not one but two such mechanisms. One is, of course, the ownership of ...

What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence From International Data
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:46:52 -0500
We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. We find that the factors identified by previous studies as important in determining the cross-section of capital structure in the US, affect firm leverage in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the US and foreign evidence suggests that the ...

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:40:34 -0500
In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the U.S. during the period 1979-1993. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the ...

The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:35:34 -0500
In the formative stages of their businesses, entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem determines the organization'sinternal structure, growth,anditseventualsize. Large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical-capital in-tensive industries, and will have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast, at hierarchies will prevail in human-capital ...

What Determines Firm Size?
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:34:20 -0500
In this paper we examine data on firm size from Europe to shed light on factors correlated with firm size. In addition to studying broad patterns, we use the data to ask whether it is sufficient to think of the firm as a black box as some theories of the firm that we label "technological" do, or whether we need to be concerned with features such as asset specificity and the process of control that are the focus of "organizational" theories. At the industry level, we find capital-intensive ...

The Tyranny of Inequality
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:32:34 -0500
This paper focuses on the externality that a contractual transfer of fungible resources can have on future interactions. The very fungibility of the resource transferred make it hard to restrict its use, changing the amount the parties involved spend in trying to grab future rents. This spill-over effect can inhibit otherwise valuable transactions, as well as enable otherwise ineffcient transactions. Agreement typically breaks down when the required transfer is large and the proposed recipient ...

The Tyranny of Inequality
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:30:01 -0500
When parties are very unequally endowed, agreement may be very difficult to reach, even if the specific transaction is easy to contract on, and fungible resources can be transferred to compensate the losing party. The very fungibility of the transferred resource makes it hard to restrict its use, and changes the amount the parties involved spend in trying to grab future rents. This spill-over effect can inhibit otherwise valuable transactions, as well as enable otherwise inefficient ...

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:28:24 -0500
In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the U.S. during the period 1979-1993. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the ...

The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:22:36 -0500
Indicators of the development of the financial sector do not improve monotonically over time. In particular, we find that by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. This pattern cannot be explained by structural theories that attribute cross-country differences in financial development to time-invariant factors, such as a country's legal origin or culture. We propose an "interest group" theory of ...

The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:19:57 -0500
Major technological, regulatory, and institutional changes have made finance more widely available in recent years. The ability of financial institutions to price a variety of exotic instruments, and to assess and spread risks, has increased. More data on potential borrowers is now available, and it is also more timely. Improvements in accounting disclosure have resulted in greater borrower transparency. Deregulation has resulted in greater competition and better prices in financial markets ...

Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth
Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:06:30 -0500
How does the development of the financial sector affect industrial growth? What effect does it have on the composition of industry, and the size distribution of firms? What is the relative importance of financial institutions and financial markets, and does it depend on the stage of economic growth? How do financial systems differ in their vulnerability to crisis? This paper attempts to provide an answer to these questions based on the current state of empirical research.

What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
Date Posted:Mon, 21 Apr 2008 12:35:45 -0500
We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. We find that factors identified by previous studies as important in determining the cross- section of capital structure in the U.S. affect firm leverage in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the ...

Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Date Posted:Thu, 17 Apr 2008 12:05:14 -0500
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to attract or retain funding. Because borrowers typically cannot repay investors on demand, investors will require a premium or significant control rights when they lend to borrowers directly, as compensation ...

Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Date Posted:Tue, 25 Mar 2008 00:47:30 -0500
In addition to borrowing from financial institutions, firms may be financed by their suppliers. Although there are many theories explaining why non-financial firms lend money, there are few comprehensive empirical tests of these theories. This paper attempts to fill the gap. We focus on a sample of small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited. We find evidence that firms use trade credit relatively more when credit from financial institutions is not available. Thus while ...

Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities Before t...
Date Posted:Wed, 19 Mar 2008 05:48:38 -0500
This paper investigates how organizational structure can affect a firm's ability to compete. In particular, we examine the two ways in which U.S. commercial banks organized their investment banking operations before the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act forced the banks to leave the securities business: as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated and capitalized securities affiliate. We document a strong movement toward the use of the affiliate structure during ...

The Paradox of Liquidity
Date Posted:Tue, 18 Mar 2008 09:36:42 -0500
The more liquid a company's assets, the greater their value in a short-notice liquidation. Liquid assets are generally viewed as increasing debt capacity, other things being equal. This paper focusses on the dark side of liquidity: greater liquidity reduces the ability of borrowers to commit to a specific course of action. It examines the effects of differences in asset liquidity on debt capacity. It suggests an alternative theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation.

New: Foreign Capital and Economic Growth
Date Posted:Tue, 04 Dec 2007 07:51:58 -0600
We document the recent phenomenon of uphill flows of capital from nonindustrial to industrial countries and analyze whether this pattern of capital flows has hurt growth in nonindustrial economies that export capital. Surprisingly, we find that there is a positive correlation between current account balances and growth among nonindustrial countries, implying that a reduced reliance on foreign capital is associated with higher growth. This result is weaker when we use panel data rather than ...

New: Foreign Capital and Economic Growth
Date Posted:Thu, 29 Nov 2007 05:55:23 -0600
We document the recent phenomenon of "uphill" flows of capital from nonindustrial to industrial countries and analyze whether this pattern of capital flows has hurt growth in nonindustrial economies that export capital. Surprisingly, we find that there is a positive correlation between current account balances and growth among nonindustrial countries, implying that a reduced reliance on foreign capital is associated with higher growth. This result is weaker when we use panel data rather than ...

New: The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Constituencies and Competitive Rent Preservation
Date Posted:Thu, 05 Apr 2007 06:00:52 -0500
Why is underdevelopment so persistent? I argue that one reason is the initial inequality in endowments and opportunities, which leads to self-interested constituencies that perpetuate the status quo. Each constituency prefers reforms that preserve only its rents and expand its opportunities, so no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. Though the initial conditions may well be a legacy of the colonial past, persistence does not require the presence of coercive political ...

Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?
Date Posted:Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:07:40 -0600
We examine the effects of aid on growth--in cross-sectional and panel data--after correcting for the bias that aid typically goes to poorer countries, or to countries after poor performance. Even after thiscorrection, we find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth. We also find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others ...

New: The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital or Constituencies
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Dec 2006 11:01:44 -0600
Why is underdevelopment so persistent? One explanation is that poor countries do not have institutions that can support growth. Because institutions (both good and bad) are persistent, underdevelopment is persistent. An alternative view is that underdevelopment comes from poor education. Neither explanation is fully satisfactory, the first because it does not explain why poor economic institutions persist even in fairly democratic but poor societies, and the second because it does not explain ...

The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century
Date Posted:Fri, 29 Sep 2006 04:17:29 -0500
We show that the development of the financial sector does not change monotonically over time. In particular, we find that by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. This pattern is inconsistent with most recent theories of why cross-country differences in financial development do not track differences in economic development, since these theories are based upon time-invariant factors, such as a ...

New: Has Finance Made the World Riskier?
Date Posted:Thu, 21 Sep 2006 23:01:58 -0500
Developments in the financial sector have led to an expansion in its ability to spread risks. The increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies, as well as in actual risk taking, has led to a range of financial transactions that hitherto were not possible, and has created much greater access to finance for firms and households. On net, this has made the world much better off. Concurrently, however, we have also seen the emergence of a whole range of intermediaries, whose size and appetite ...

New: Modernizing China's Growth Paradigm
Date Posted:Tue, 05 Sep 2006 08:36:35 -0500
In the literature theoretical models have appeared that predict a positive impact of the level of individual wealth on the job exit probability. Empirically this prediction is most likely to be relevant for elderly workers who have been able to accumulate wealth throughout their working life and whose residual working life is relatively short. In the Netherlands, as in other European countries, there is a tendency of introducing more individual choice options in pension schemes. It is likely ...

New: The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital, or Constituencies?
Date Posted:Sun, 03 Sep 2006 21:15:10 -0500
Why is underdevelopment so persistent? One explanation is that poor countries do not have institutions that can support growth. Because institutions (both good and bad) are persistent, underdevelopment is persistent. An alternative view is that underdevelopment comes from poor education. Neither explanation is fully satisfactory, the first because it does not explain why poor economic institutions persist even in fairly democratic but poor societies, and the second because it does not explain ...

REVISION: The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
Date Posted:Tue, 29 Aug 2006 08:03:18 -0500
Using a detailed database of managerial job descriptions, reporting relationships, and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms, we find that firm hierarchies are becoming flatter. The number of positions reporting directly to the CEO has gone up significantly over time while the number of levels between the division heads and the CEO has decreased. More of these managers now report directly to the CEO and more are being appointed officers of the firm, reflecting a delegation of ...

What Undermines Aid`s Impact on Growth?
Date Posted:Mon, 31 Jul 2006 00:28:58 -0500
We examine one of the most important and intriguing puzzles in economics: why it is so hard to find a robust effect of aid on the long-term growth of poor countries, even those with good policies. We look for a possible offset to the beneficial effects of aid, using a methodology that exploits both cross-country and within-country variation. We find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country`s competitiveness, as reflected in a decline in the share of labor intensive and ...

India's Pattern of Development: What Happened, What Follows?
Date Posted:Tue, 30 May 2006 21:38:52 -0500
India has followed an idiosyncratic pattern of development, certainly compared with other fast-growing Asian economies. While the importance of services rather than manufacturing is widely noted, within manufacturing India has emphasized skill-intensive rather than labor-intensive manufacturing, and industries with higher-than-average scale. Some of these distinctive patterns existed prior to the beginning of economic reforms in the 1980s, and stem from the idiosyncratic policies adopted after ...

Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Date Posted:Thu, 25 May 2006 04:12:29 -0500
The distance between small firms and their lenders in the United States is increasing. Not only are firms choosing more distant lenders, they are also communicating with them in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate that they do not stem from small firms locating differently, from simple consolidation in the banking industry, or from biases in the sample. Instead, they seem correlated with improvements in bank productivity. We conjecture that greater, ...

A Theory of Bank Capital
Date Posted:Thu, 25 May 2006 04:11:43 -0500
Banks can create liquidity because their deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty can make deposits excessively fragile in which case there is a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces liquidity creation by the bank but enables the bank to survive more often and avoid distress. A more subtle effect is that banks with different amounts of capital extract different amounts of repayment from borrowers. The optimal bank capital structure trades off the ...

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
Date Posted:Thu, 25 May 2006 04:10:23 -0500
In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions. The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm`s divisions. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the U.S. during the period 1979-1993. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to ...

New: The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital, or Constituencies?
Date Posted:Sat, 13 May 2006 19:37:08 -0500
Why is underdevelopment so persistent? One explanation is that poor countries do not have institutions that can support growth. Because institutions (both good and bad) are persistent, underdevelopment is persistent. An alternative view is that underdevelopment comes from poor education. Neither explanation is fully satisfactory, the first because it does not explain why poor economic institutions persist even in fairly democratic but poor societies, and the second because it does not explain ...

Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?
Date Posted:Wed, 10 May 2006 20:27:35 -0500
We examine the effects of aid on growth - in cross-sectional and panel data - after correcting for the bias that aid typically goes to poorer countries, or to countries after poor performance. Even after this correction, we find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth. We also find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others.

New: India's Patterns of Development: What Happened, What Follows
Date Posted:Thu, 27 Apr 2006 11:22:38 -0500
India seems to have followed an idiosyncratic pattern of development, certainly compared to other fast-growing Asian economies. While the emphasis on services rather than manufacturing has been widely noted, within manufacturing India has emphasized skill-intensive rather than labor-intensive manufacturing, and industries with typically higher average scale. We show that some of these distinctive patterns existed even prior to the beginning of economic reforms in the 1980s, and argue they stem ...

What Undermines Aid`s Impact on Growth?
Date Posted:Fri, 03 Mar 2006 04:13:29 -0600
We examine one of the most important and intriguing puzzles in economics: why it is so hard to find a robust effect of aid on the long-term growth of poor countries, even those with good policies. We look for a possible offset to the beneficial effects of aid, using a methodology that exploits both cross-country and within-country variation. We find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country`s competitiveness, as reflected in a decline in the share of labor intensive and ...

Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?
Date Posted:Wed, 25 Jan 2006 00:19:00 -0600
Developments in the financial sector have led to an expansion in its ability to spread risks. The increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies, as well as in actual risk taking, has led to a range of financial transactions that hitherto were not possible, and has created much greater access to finance for firms and households. On net, this has made the world much better off. Concurrently, however, we have also seen the emergence of a whole range of intermediaries, whose size and appetite ...

The Real Effect of Banking Crises
Date Posted:Wed, 12 Oct 2005 05:24:42 -0500
Banking crises are usually followed by a decline in credit and growth. Is this because crises tend to take place during economic downturns, or do banking sector problems have independent negative effects on the economy? To answer this question we examine industrial sectors with differing needs for financing. If banking crises have an exogenous detrimental effect on real activity, then sectors more dependent on external finance should perform relatively worse during banking crises. The evidence ...

Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data
Date Posted:Mon, 23 May 2005 11:26:00 -0500
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally "high entry" industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. The consequences of more restrictive entry barriers are ...

The Real Effect of Banking Crises
Date Posted:Fri, 06 May 2005 10:35:28 -0500
Banking crises are usually followed by a decline in credit and growth. Is this because crises tend to take place during economic downturns, or do banking sector problems have independent negative effects on the economy? To answer this question we examine industrial sectors with differing needs for financing. If banking crises have an exogenous detrimental effect on real activity, then sectors more dependent on external finance should perform relatively worse during banking crises. The evidence ...

Money in a Theory of Banking
Date Posted:Mon, 21 Feb 2005 22:08:35 -0600
We explore the connection between money, banks, and aggregate credit. We start with a simple 'real' model without money, where banks make loans repayable in goods and depositors hold claims on the bank payable on demand in goods. Aggregate production may be delayed in the economy. If so, we show that the level of ongoing bank lending, and hence of aggregate future output, can decrease with increases in the real repayment due on deposits: ceteris paribus, the higher the amount due, the more ...

Dollar Shortages and Crises
Date Posted:Tue, 02 Nov 2004 10:54:14 -0600
Emerging markets do not handle adverse shocks well. In this paper, I will outline an explanation of why emerging markets are so fragile, and why they may adopt contractual mechanisms - such as a dollarized banking system - that increase their fragility. I draw on this analysis to explain why dollarized economies may be prone to dollar shortages and twin crises. The model of crises described here differs in some important aspects from what is now termed the first, second, and third generation ...

Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?
Date Posted:Fri, 28 May 2004 07:34:18 -0500
Why do some firms tend to offer executives a variety of perks while others offer none at all? A widespread view in the corporate finance literature is that executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for managers to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates. According to this view, firms with plenty of free cash flow that operate in industries with limited investment prospects should typically offer perks. The theory also suggests that firms that are subject ...

Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data
Date Posted:Wed, 26 May 2004 22:27:00 -0500
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value-added per employee in naturally 'high entry' industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse ...

Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data
Date Posted:Tue, 25 May 2004 23:14:54 -0500
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally "high entry" industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse ...

Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Date Posted:Sun, 29 Feb 2004 22:03:50 -0600
The distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing, and they are communicating in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate they do not arise from small firms locating differently, consolidation in the banking industry, or biases in the sample. Instead, improvements in lender productivity appear to explain our findings. We also find distant firms no longer have to be the highest quality credits, indicating they have greater access to credit ...

Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises
Date Posted:Thu, 01 Jan 2004 18:36:12 -0600
We show in this paper that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or ex ante contractual links between banks, we argue bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a possible total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity problems and ...

Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis
Date Posted:Thu, 18 Dec 2003 01:47:25 -0600
As a result of the Asian crisis, relationship-based systems are now under attack for being inefficient and corrupt. Yet, till recently, they were proposed as an alternative form of capitalism to the arm's length Anglo-Saxon system. What went wrong? This paper suggests that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital scarce. Power relationships substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But a ...

Money in a Theory of Banking
Date Posted:Sun, 14 Dec 2003 20:12:17 -0600
We explore the connection between money, banks, and aggregate credit. We start with a simple 'real' model without money, where banks make loans repayable in goods and depositors hold claims on the bank payable on demand in goods. Aggregate production may be delayed in the economy. If so, we show that the level of ongoing bank lending, and hence of aggregate future output, can decrease with increases in the real repayment due on deposits: ceteris paribus, the higher the amount due, the more ...

Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Ban...
Date Posted:Wed, 26 Nov 2003 04:32:18 -0600
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally "difficult" credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, ...

Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises
Date Posted:Mon, 24 Nov 2003 06:33:59 -0600
We show in this paper that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or ex ante contractual links between banks, we argue bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a possible total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity problems and ...

Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking
Date Posted:Sat, 15 Nov 2003 07:14:22 -0600
What ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We argue that since banks often lend via commitments, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. There will be synergies between the two activities to the extent that both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets: If deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities ...

Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking
Date Posted:Sat, 15 Nov 2003 07:02:56 -0600
This paper addresses the following question: what ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We begin by observing that since banks often lend via commitments, or credit lines, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of the same primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. After all, once the decision to extend a line of credit has been made, it is really nothing more than a checking account with overdraft ...

Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European Finance
Date Posted:Tue, 24 Jun 2003 04:58:56 -0500
In the last two decades the European financial markets have become more market-oriented. We analyse the economic and political forces that have triggered these changes as well as their likely welfare implications. We also try to assess whether this trend will continue. Based on our analysis, we conjecture that even if Europe might benefit from a continuation of the trend, in the near future political support for it is likely to become much weaker. Furthermore, without serious reforms, the ...

Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European Finance
Date Posted:Tue, 24 Jun 2003 02:16:32 -0500
In the last two decades the European financial markets have become more market oriented. We analyze the economic and political forces that have triggered these changes as well as their likely welfare implications. We also try to assess whether this trend will continue. Based on our analysis, we conjecture that even if Europe might benefit from a continuation of the trend, in the near future political support for it is likely to become much weaker. Furthermore, without serious reforms, the ...

The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
Date Posted:Mon, 28 Apr 2003 23:11:35 -0500
Using a detailed database of managerial job descriptions, reporting relationships, and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms we find that the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO has gone up significantly over time. We also find that the number of levels between the lowest managers with profit center responsibility (division heads) and the CEO has decreased and more of these managers are reporting directly to the CEO. Moreover, more of these managers are being ...

Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Ban...
Date Posted:Wed, 22 May 2002 02:48:00 -0500
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally 'difficult' credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, ...

The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms
Date Posted:Fri, 05 Oct 2001 03:41:33 -0500
Major technological, regulatory, and institutional changes have made finance more widely available in recent years, amounting to a bone fide 'financial revolution'. In this article, we focus on the impact the financial revolution has had on the way firms are (or should be) organized and managed, and on the policy consequences.

The Governance of the New Enterprise
Date Posted:Fri, 05 Oct 2001 02:54:11 -0500
The changing nature of the corporation forces us to re-examine much of what we take for granted in corporate governance. What precisely is the entity that is being governed? How does the governance system obtain power over it, and what determines the division of power between various stakeholders? And is the objective of allocating power only to enhance the returns of outside investors? In this paper we argue that, given the changing nature of the firm, the focus of corporate governance must ...

What Determines Firm Size?
Date Posted:Thu, 04 Oct 2001 07:06:01 -0500
Motivated by theories of the firm, which we classify as technological' or organizational,' we analyze the determinants of firm size across industries and across countries in a sample of 15 European countries. We find that, on average, firms facing larger markets are larger. At the industry level, we find firms in the utility sector are large, perhaps because they enjoy a natural, or officially sanctioned, monopoly. Capital intensive industries, high wage industries, and industries that do a ...

The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms
Date Posted:Thu, 10 May 2001 07:27:46 -0500
Major technological, regulatory, and institutional changes have made finance more widely available in recent years, amounting to a bona fide 'financial revolution'. In this article, we focus on the impact the financial revolution has had on the way firms are (or should be) organized and managed, and on the policy consequences.

The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century
Date Posted:Thu, 03 May 2001 08:07:48 -0500
We show that the development of the financial sector does not change monotonically over time. In particular, we find that by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. This pattern is inconsistent with most recent theories of why cross-country differences in financial development do not track differences in economic development, since these theories are based upon time-invariant factors, such as a ...

Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Date Posted:Fri, 13 Apr 2001 09:04:14 -0500
The distance between small firms and their lenders in the United States is increasing. Not only are firms choosing more distant lenders, they are also communicating with them in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate that they do not stem from small firms locating differently, from consolidation in the banking industry, or from biases in the sample. Instead, they seem correlated with improvements in bank productivity. We conjecture that greater, and ...

The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms
Date Posted:Mon, 09 Apr 2001 15:55:57 -0500
A fundamental problem entrepreneurs face in the formative stages of their businesses is how to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem will determine the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size. In particular, our model suggests large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries, and these will typically have ...

Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications
Date Posted:Sun, 01 Apr 2001 13:42:37 -0500
Short-term borrowing has often been blamed for precipitating financial crises. We argue that while the empirical association between a financial institution's, or country's, short-term borrowing and susceptibility to crises may, in fact, exist, the direction of causality is often precisely the opposite to the one traditionally suggested by commentators. Institutions like banks that want to enhance their ability to provide liquidity and credit to difficult borrowers have to borrow short-term ...

Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before t...
Date Posted:Wed, 07 Mar 2001 06:56:20 -0600
The following is a description of the paper, and not the actual abstract: This paper investigates empirically whether the internal organization of the firm can play an important role in affecting a firm's ability to commit to a particular quality of business practices and, if so, whether competition would be sufficient to lead firms to adopt that structure. In particular, we study how commercial banks have developed "firewalls" to address potential conflicts of interest when they are also ...

Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking
Date Posted:Fri, 15 Sep 2000 01:39:36 -0500
This paper addresses the following question: what ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We begin by observing that since banks often lend via commitments, or credit lines, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of the same primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. After all, once the decision to extend a line of credit has been made, it is really nothing more than a checking account with overdraft ...

Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications
Date Posted:Fri, 08 Sep 2000 09:01:32 -0500
Short-term borrowing has often been blamed for precipitating financial crises. We argue that while the empirical association between a financial institution's, or country's, short-term borrowing and susceptibility to crises may, in fact, exist, the direction of causality is often precisely the opposite to the one traditionally suggested by commentators. Institutions like banks that want to enhance their ability to provide liquidity and credit to difficult borrowers have to borrow short-term ...

The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
Date Posted:Wed, 23 Aug 2000 03:54:17 -0500
This paper provides a simple model showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The model has implications about the availability and the price of credit as firms age in different markets. The paper offers evidence for these ...

A Theory of Bank Capital
Date Posted:Thu, 20 Jul 2000 07:06:13 -0500
Banks can create liquidity because their deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty can make deposits excessively fragile in which case there is a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces liquidity creation by the bank but enables the bank to survive more often and avoid distress. A more subtle effect is that banks with different amounts of capital extract different amounts of repayment from borrowers. The optimal bank capital structure trades off the ...

Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Date Posted:Thu, 20 Jul 2000 07:03:44 -0500
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to attract or retain funding. We argue that financial intermediation can resolve these liquidity problems that arise in direct lending. Banks enable depositors to withdraw at low cost, as well as buffer firms ...

Power in a Theory of the Firm
Date Posted:Mon, 17 Jul 2000 09:10:05 -0500
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents" who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the" primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this" literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. " Access can be better than ownership because: i) the power agents get from access is more ...

The Tyranny of the Inefficient: An Enquiry into the Adverse Consequences of Power Struggles
Date Posted:Sun, 11 Jun 2000 02:00:40 -0500
Life is replete with instances where two closely related parties forego mutually advantageous opportunities: peace treaties are not signed, inefficient regulations are not altered, and possibilities for investment are frittered away. Since the parties are in close contact, asymmetric information cannot be an explanation for the failure to agree. The explanation this paper offers is based on the assumption that when two parties interact repeatedly, not all aspects of the relationship are ...

Financial Dependence and Growth
Date Posted:Sat, 13 May 2000 01:57:15 -0500
Does finance affect economic growth? A number of studies have identified a positive correlation between the level of development of a country's financial sector and the rate of growth of its per capita income. As has been noted elsewhere, the observed correlation does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. This paper examines whether financial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that financial development reduces the costs of ...

The Tyranny of the Inefficient: An Enquiry into the Adverse Consequences of Power Struggles
Date Posted:Wed, 22 Mar 2000 09:24:44 -0600
There are many instances where two closely related parties do not agree to mutually advantageous transactions even when there are simple enforceable contracts, and side transfers of fungible resources, that would implement them. Peace treaties are not signed, inefficient regulations are not altered, and possibilities for investment are frittered away. One reason, which has been extensively analyzed in the literature, is the presence of informational asymmetries. In this paper we focus on ...

Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act
Date Posted:Tue, 01 Sep 1998 06:47:40 -0500
This paper investigates empirically whether the internal organization of the firm can play an important role in affecting a firm's ability to commit to a particular quality of business practices and, if so, whether competition would be sufficient to lead firms to adopt that structure. In particular, we study how commercial banks have developed "firewalls" to address potential conflicts of interest when they are also engaged in investment banking. Before the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act forced banks ...

The Paradox Of Liquidity
Date Posted:Sat, 29 Aug 1998 06:01:29 -0500
The more liquid a company's assets, the greater their value in a short-notice liquidation. Liquid assets are generally viewed as increasing debt capacity, other things being equal. This paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity: greater liquidity reduces the ability of borrowers to commit to a specific course of action. It examines the effects of differences in asset liquidity on debt capacity. It suggests an alternative theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation.

Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Date Posted:Sat, 22 Aug 1998 08:10:56 -0500
In addition to borrowing from financial institutions, firms may be financed by their suppliers. Although there are many theories explaining why non financial firms lend money, there are few comprehensive empirical tests of these theories. This paper attempts to fill the gap. We focus on a sample of small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited. We find evidence that firms use trade credit relatively more when credit from financial institutions is not available. Thus while short ...

Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before t...
Date Posted:Tue, 21 Apr 1998 11:03:06 -0500
We examine the two ways in which U.S. commercial banks organized their investment banking operations before the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act forced the banks to leave the securities business: as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated affiliate with its own board of directors. While departments underwrote seemingly higher quality firms and securities than did comparable affiliates, the departments obtained lower prices for the issues they underwrote. The ...

The Past and Future of Commercial Banking Viewed Through an Incomplete Contract Lens
Date Posted:Sat, 11 Apr 1998 08:06:31 -0500
Commercial banks emerged at a time when contracts were very incomplete and property rights insecure. They typically offered demand deposits, made loans on demand, and were regulated. Each of these aspects of the institutional structure were essential in helping the bank provide the twin functions of liquidity and safety. I argue that recent theories of banking, which I collectively refer to as "Incomplete Contract" theories of banking, explain well the origins of banking. I also claim that ...

What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
Date Posted:Tue, 10 Feb 1998 22:51:09 -0600
We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. We find that factors identified by previous studies as correlated in the cross-section with firm leverage in the U.S., are similarly correlated in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the theoretical ...

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
Date Posted:Thu, 05 Feb 1998 06:43:24 -0600
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentive to engage in costly monitoring. Thus loan contracts must be structured so as to enhance this incentive. Short-term debt gives the lender the power to force renegotiation or liquidation when the debt matures, but this ability is not contingent on monitoring. By contrast, covenants make the loan's effective maturity, and the ...

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
Date Posted:Thu, 05 Feb 1998 06:41:21 -0600
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do so. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make the effective maturity of a loan contingent on monitoring by the lender. The ability to secure a loan makes the effective priority of the loan contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral ...

Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings
Date Posted:Wed, 31 Dec 1997 06:23:36 -0600
We examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) completed over the 1975-1987 period to see how they relate to three well-documented IPO anomalies. We find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential of recent IPOs and about their long term growth prospects. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, ...