Lars Stole studies strategic pricing, contracts and incentives theory, industrial economics and game theory. Stole’s research has appeared in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Journal of Political Economy, among others. He has published a comprehensive survey of research in strategic price discrimination in “Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments,” which appeared in the Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3.
Stole has been awarded numerous prizes for his research, including an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, a National Science Foundation Presidential Faculty Fellowship, and an Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics from the Harvard Law School. In the past, he has lectured at MIT, CERGE/Prague, and CES/Munich, and he has served as Editor of the RAND Journal of Economics. Stole currently is a research fellow for CESifo, and a Co-Director of the Applied Theory Initiative, which he founded in 2009.
2014 - 2015 Course Schedule
Economics of contracts and organizations; industrial organization; informational economics; current research focuses on price discrimination and competitive contracting.
With David Martimort, "Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, 76 (2012), 753-772.
With David Martimort, “Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games,” RAND Journal of Economics (2009).
"Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments," Handbook of Industrial Organization (2008).
With David Martimort, "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica (2002).
With Jean-Charles Rochet, "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," Review of Economic Studies (2002).
For a listing of research publications please visit
’s university library listing