Faculty & Research

Stacey Kole

Clinical Professor of Economics; Deputy Dean for the Full-Time MBA Program

Phone :
773 702-7121
Address :
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637

Stacey R. Kole is the deputy dean of the Full-Time MBA Program. Her research interests cover policies and practices that dictate behavior within organizations and its relation to firm performance. Her publications include "Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers: The Case of USAir's Acquisition of Piedmont Aviation," with Kenneth Lehn, in Mergers and Productivity, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2000; "Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structure: The Case of U.S. Airlines Industry," with Kenneth Lehn published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 1999; and "The Complexity of Compensation Contracts" in the 1997 Journal of Financial Economics.

She previously served as a member of the faculty associate dean for MBA Programs at the University of Rochester's Simon School of Business. Prior to her career in academics, Kole was a financial economist in the Office of Economic Analysis, at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Kole received a bachelor's degree in history and economics from the University of Rochester in 1982. She received her PhD in economics in 1992 from the University of Chicago.

 

2013 - 2014 Course Schedule

Number Name Quarter
31701 Leadership Effectiveness & Development (LEAD) Lab I 2014 (Spring)
31702 Leadership Effectiveness and Development (LEAD) Lab II 2013 (Fall)
33032 Managing the Workplace 2014 (Winter)

2014 - 2015 Course Schedule

Number Name Quarter
31701 Leadership Effectiveness & Development (LEAD) Lab I 2015 (Spring)
31702 Leadership Effectiveness and Development (LEAD) Lab II 2014 (Fall)
33032 Managing the Workplace 2015 (Winter)

Other Interests

Travel, cooking, and family adventures.

 

Research Activities

Interest in policies and practices that dictate behavior within organizations and its relation to firm performance.

With Kenneth Lehn, "Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers: The Case of USAir's Acquisition of Piedmont Aviation," Mergers and Productivity (National Bureau of Economic Research 2000).

With Kenneth Lehn, "Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structure: The Case of U.S. Airlines Industry," Journal of Financial Economics (1999).

"The Complexity of Compensation Contracts," Journal of Financial Economics (1997).

For a listing of research publications please visit ’s university library listing page.

Economics, Demography and Communication
Date Posted: Nov  27, 2000
This paper presents a model in which agents are distinguished by their characteristics, communication between firms and their customers plays an important role, and agents with similar characteristics communicate more effectively. The model is applied to annual data on the distribution of men and women across manufacturing and services in twelve OECD countries from 1965-93. These data display surprising regularities. The model provides an explanation for this in terms of technological change in

Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structures: The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry
Date Posted: Aug  29, 2000
Deregulation provides a natural experiment for examining how governance adapts to structural change in the business environment. We investigate the evolution of governance structure--ownership concentration, compensation policy, and board composition--in the U.S. airline industry during a 22- year period surrounding the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Consistent with theory, we find that after deregulation 1) equity ownership is more concentrated; 2) CEO pay increases; 3) stock option grants t

Workforce Integration and the Disspiation of Value in Mergers: The Case of USAir's Acquisition of Pi...
Date Posted: Aug  29, 2000
In 1987, the USAir Group acquired Piedmont Aviation for $1.6 billion in a cash tender offer. Prior to the merger, comparably sized USAir and Piedmont were among the most profitable carriers in the industry. Almost immediately after the integration of the two airlines, USAir became the industry's least profitable carrier and came close to bankruptcy. This paper concludes that the major source of the value destruction in the merger was USAir's workforce integration strategy. The decision to buy la

The Government as a Shareholder: A Case From The U.S.
Date Posted: Sep  15, 1999
We study a sample of U.S. corporations in which the federal government held between 35 percent and 100 percent of the outstanding common stock during and following World War II. We find that the firms experienced abnormally high turnover among corporate board members but that the tenure of senior management was relatively stable. We also find that the performance of the government-owned companies was not significantly different than private-sector firms in the same industry. We attribute this co

Measuring Managerial Equity Ownership: A Comparison of Sources of Ownership Data
Date Posted: Jun  18, 1998
This paper demonstrates that differences in managerial stock ownership data cannot explain contradictory empirical evidence on the entrenchment of managers through equity. Three commonly used sources of managerial equity ownership data are described and contrasted. Value Line Investment Surveys are shown to be a relatively low-cost substitute for the beneficial ownership data for officers and directors found in corporate proxy statements.

Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentives or Rewards?
Date Posted: Feb  10, 1998
Managerial ownership of equity both aligns shareholder and management interests and places voting power in the hands of corporate decision-makers. The cross-sectional relation between management ownership and firm performance has been interpreted as evidence of these conflicting influences. In this paper, new evidence draws attention to the cumulation of managerial stockholdings and argue for a reversal of causality in the ownership-performance relation: firm performance is a determinant of mana

Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentives or Rewards?
Date Posted: Feb  10, 1998
Managerial ownership of equity both aligns shareholder and management interests and places voting power in the hands of corporate decision-makers. The cross-sectional relation between management ownership and firm performance has been interpreted as evidence of these conflicting influences. In this paper, new evidence draws attention to the cumulation of managerial stockholdings and argues for a reversal of causality in the ownership-performance relation: firm performance is a determinant of man