Eric Budish researches auction and matching markets, and more broadly he is interested in the design of market institutions. His most recent research concerns high-frequency trading and the design of financial markets. Budish and his collaborators show that the continuous limit order book is a flawed market design, and argue that financial exchanges should instead use frequent batch auctions: uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions conducted at frequent but discrete time intervals, such as every 1 second. Budish’s dissertation research concerned the design of markets for combinatorial assignment problems, such as matching students to schedules of courses or workers to schedules of shifts. His proposed market design was recently adopted by the Wharton School for MBA course allocation. Other past and ongoing research projects relate to patent design and R&D incentives, internet auctions, school choice procedures, and the market for event tickets. Two theoretical topics of recent interest are the use of randomness in market design, and incentives for truth-telling in large markets. Budish writes “I am motivated by the idea that my work can improve the efficacy of real-world market institutions.”
Budish teaches an MBA elective course on competitive strategy, and a PhD topics course on market design.
Budish received his PhD in Business Economics from Harvard University before joining Chicago Booth in 2009. He received a BA in Economics and Philosophy from Amherst College and an M.Phil. in Economics from Oxford (Nuffield College), where he was a Marshall Scholar. Prior to graduate school, Budish worked at Goldman Sachs as an analyst in the Mergers and Acquisitions group.
2013 - 2014 Course Schedule
Technology, politics, music, travel, outdoors
Market design, microeconomic theory, industrial organization, finance
With Peter Cramton and John Shim, “The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response,” (working paper).
With Benjamin Roin and Heidi Williams, “Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials,” (working paper).
“The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119(6), pp 1061-1103 (Dec 2011).
With Estelle Cantillon, “The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,” American Economic Review, Vol. 102(5), Aug 2012, pp. 2237-71.
With Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom, “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications" American Economic Review, Vol. 103(2), April 2013, pp 585-623.